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Universal De Novo Review
Chad M. Oldfather*
Introduction
The idea that appellate courts owe no deference to the legal rul-
ings of lower courts is as unexamined as it is familiar.  The concept of
de novo review is one that every lawyer encounters early in the course
of her legal education.  Moreover, she learns that the use of de novo
review is universal—that every time an appellate court reviews a legal
determination made by a trial court, it considers the question anew,
and accords no deference to the lower court’s decision.  This bit of
learning seems typically to be accompanied by a vague suggestion that
the practice is due to expertise, specialization, or some other compe-
tence advantage that appellate judges and courts enjoy relative to
their trial-level counterparts.1  Whatever its basis, the idea has become
an accepted truth, one of those things that every lawyer knows and
has known for so long that we regard it as an unalterable feature of
the legal landscape.2
On reflection, however, the practice is somewhat puzzling.
Surely the standard explanations are, at best, incomplete.  Whatever
advantages appellate courts might generally have over trial courts, it
seems unlikely that they would hold across every legal question that
might arise in every case.  What is more, the notion of universal de
novo review stands in tension with a whole host of reform efforts and
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participants in a workshop at Marquette University for their helpful comments and input.
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1 See, e.g., RICHARD D. FREER, INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL PROCEDURE § 14.7 (2006)
(“This intrusive review is appropriate because the determination of what the law is, is not some-
thing on which the trial court would have especial expertise . . . .  It is a dry question of research,
which the appellate court may actually be better equipped than the trial court to perform.”); see
also ALLAN IDES & CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, CIVIL PROCEDURE 1056–57 (2d ed. 2006) (implying
that the standard is based on competence, despite similar training in the law among district and
appellate court judges).  Other introductory texts attribute the de novo standard to the need to
ensure uniformity. See, e.g., THOMAS D. ROWE, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 300 (2004) (stat-
ing that de novo review of questions of law “reflects the importance of attempting to assure
uniformity in the definition of generally applicable legal standards”).
2 As Professor Caminker noted in concluding his analysis of why lower courts are bound
to follow precedent, “Familiarity dulls curiosity.”  Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts
Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 873 (1994).
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other developments in the judicial process literature over the past dec-
ade or so.  Universal de novo review provides appellate courts with a
broad warrant to engage in lawmaking.3  Yet the trend has been to
suggest that courts ought to make less law.  Scholars have argued in
favor of decisional minimalism, pursuant to which courts ought to de-
cide cases on the narrowest available grounds.4  They have argued that
appellate courts should exercise their “passive virtues” to avoid mak-
ing law in certain situations.5  Still others have suggested that interme-
diate appellate courts should be given the power to control their
dockets through a mechanism of discretionary review.6  Meanwhile,
appellate courts have embraced the issuance of “unpublished” opin-
ions, one of the chief features of which is that they have no preceden-
tial effect.7  And then there is Bush v. Gore,8 for better or worse the
poster child for the proposition that courts might sometimes find it
appropriate to resolve questions of law but not to make law,9 and, by
virtue of the controversy surrounding it, for the notion that any such
power ought to be somehow constrained.10
All of this suggests the need to gain a better understanding not
merely of de novo review, but also of the universality of its applica-
tion.  After all, when coupled with the doctrine of precedent and the
3 See generally Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, Judicial Federalism and the Ad-
ministrative States, 87 CAL. L. REV. 613, 658 (1999) (“[D]e novo review actually gives the courts
a greater role in lawmaking than does deferential review.”).
4 See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT 4 (1999) (“Decisional minimalism has two attractive features.  First, it is likely
to reduce the burdens of judicial decision . . . .  Second, and more fundamentally, minimalism is
likely to make judicial errors less frequent and (above all) less damaging.”).
5 See infra text accompanying notes 180–84.
6 See generally DANIEL J. MEADOR ET AL., APPELLATE COURTS 1040–50 (2d ed. 2006)
(reprinting and commenting on Donald P. Lay, A Proposal for Discretionary Review in Federal
Courts of Appeals, 34 SW. L.J. 1151, 1155–58 (1981); Bernard G. Barrow, The Discretionary
Appeal: A Cost Effective Tool of Appellate Justice, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 31 (1988); and
DANIEL J. MEADOR, APPELLATE COURTS: STAFF AND PROCESS IN THE CRISIS OF VOLUME
168–71 (1974)).
7 There has been an enormous amount of commentary concerning the use of unpublished
opinions over the past decade.  For a small sampling, see Martha Dragich Pearson, Citation of
Unpublished Opinions as Precedent, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1235, 1275–93 (2004); Michael B.W. Sin-
clair, Anastasoff Versus Hart: The Constitutionality and Wisdom of Denying Precedential Author-
ity to Circuit Court Decisions, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 695, 705–10 (2003); Lauren Robel, The
Practice of Precedent: Anastasoff, Noncitation Rules, and the Meaning of Precedent in an Inter-
pretive Community, 35 IND. L. REV. 399, 402–04 (2002).
8 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
9 See id. at 109 (“Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances.”).
10 See generally RICHARD L. PACELLE, JR., THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERI-
CAN POLITICS 9–31 (2002) (describing the issues raised by judicial policymaking in light of Bush
v. Gore).
310 The George Washington Law Review [Vol. 77:308
understanding that courts must decide the disputes that come before
them,11 universal de novo review amounts to a requirement that
courts make law in all cases presenting contested legal issues.  If, as
the developments outlined in the preceding paragraph suggest, there
is reason to believe that such an obligation is not desirable, then per-
haps curtailing the universality of de novo review provides another
avenue for achieving that end.  We might instead authorize appellate
courts to engage in deference—something of a Chevron doctrine12 for
trial courts—in certain circumstances.
This Article’s aim is to enhance our understanding of the practice
of de novo review, with special emphasis on four subsidiary questions.
First, how might the practice of de novo review be justified?  Does
institutional competence provide the answer, or must we look more
broadly?  Second, do those justifications support the universal imple-
mentation of de novo review?  Put another way, assuming there are
good reasons for appellate courts to engage in de novo review of some
portion of the legal determinations that come before them, do those
reasons support such review of every legal issue confronted on ap-
peal?  Third, if the answer to the second question falls somewhere
short of a resounding yes, might it make sense to do away with univer-
sal de novo review?  Fourth and finally, assuming that we might want
to reserve de novo review for certain types of cases or questions (or,
to reverse the presumption, that we might want to except certain types
of cases or questions from de novo review), how might we go about
doing it?
The analysis, which focuses on possible consequentialist ratio-
nales for the practice, reveals that the notion of universal de novo
review is nowhere near so easily warranted as our intuitions would
suggest,13 that there is no single coherent justification for the practice,
and that any serious effort to articulate a justification requires reliance
on a cluster of reasons that, while they do not collectively amount to a
complete justification, might nonetheless suffice to provide a rule-con-
sequentialist account.  It also reveals that there are potentially serious
11 For an analysis of the nature of this “duty to decide,” see Chad M. Oldfather, Defining
Judicial Inactivism: Models of Adjudication and the Duty to Decide, 94 GEO. L.J. 121, 161–80
(2005).
12 The Chevron doctrine, arising out of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44, 864–66 (1984), requires courts in certain circumstances to
defer to agency interpretations of their governing statutes and is rooted in considerations of
institutional competence and separation of powers. See, e.g., Note, The Two Faces of Chevron,
120 HARV. L. REV. 1562, 1562 (2007).
13 See infra Part II.
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costs associated with universal de novo review.14  Because it effec-
tively obligates courts to make law in every case presenting legal is-
sues, it will lead to the creation of law in cases where it is inadvisable
to do so, and thus lead to the creation of “bad” law.  This could occur
because the case before the court is factually atypical and thus not
representative of the range of situations over which the rule formu-
lated by the court will apply, because the parties fail to provide the
court with the inputs it needs to engage in effective lawmaking, or
because the court itself lacks the requisite legal or factual expertise to
formulate an appropriate rule of law.
Changes over the past half century in the context in which judg-
ing occurs have made these concerns more acute.  Appellate caseloads
have skyrocketed,15 leaving judges with less time for each case and
thereby reducing any competence advantage that may have stemmed
from appellate judges’ ability to engage in less hurried contemplation.
Accompanying procedural modifications have made it easier, and
probably more tempting, for a court inclined to “duck” a difficult is-
sue to do so.  Evidence suggests that courts have taken advantage of
these opportunities.16  While such avoidance may be normatively de-
sirable for the reasons just referenced, the lack of doctrinally sanc-
tioned channels for its exercise means that it presently can only take
place via subterfuge.17  Thus, it is worth exploring the formulation of a
mechanism to govern the exercise of appellate deference to the legal
determinations of lower courts.
The remainder of the Article proceeds as follows.  Part I first
gives further definition to the inquiry and then attempts to provide a
comprehensive review of the justifications for de novo review, accom-
panied in each instance by a critique of the particular justification
under consideration.  The analysis reveals that the primary justifica-
tions fall into two general categories.  The first has to do with the insti-
tutional competence of appellate courts to resolve contested legal
issues.  The second includes reasons for de novo review that stem
from systemic needs rather than from an assumption that appellate
courts will necessarily generate better law.  Part II assesses the justifi-
cations as a whole, considering whether universal de novo review can
be justified on either act-consequentialist or rule-consequentialist
grounds, and concluding that the latter presents the only plausible
14 See infra Part II.B.
15 See infra notes 79–81 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 169–71 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 172–76 and accompanying text.
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source of justification.  Finally, Part III considers the possibility of def-
erence.  Even if we conclude that universal de novo review could be
justified on rule-consequentialist grounds, we might determine that a
readily administrable rule of non-universal review would generate an
even greater net benefit.  Although the Article does not attempt to
articulate the content of such a rule in great detail, it does outline
some of its basic components.  These include a limitation to cases of
first impression in which the appellate court has a basis for believing
that it is at a lawmaking disadvantage.
I. The Underpinnings of De Novo Review
Assessment of the practice of de novo review requires first an
understanding of the institutional arrangements and related norms
that underlie the practice.  This Part begins by defining the inquiry
more specifically and follows with a brief overview of the functions of
appellate review.  Finally, it reveals some of the jurisprudential as-
sumptions that are implicit in the practice of universal de novo review.
All of this is undertaken with an eye toward more fully understanding
the practice, which in turn supports a more informed assessment of its
appropriateness.
A. Defining the Scope of the Inquiry
This Article analyzes what I will call “universal de novo review,”
by which I mean the practice pursuant to which appellate courts en-
gage in de novo review of every legal issue presented to them.  To
phrase it somewhat differently, the inquiry concerns why we expect—
indeed, require—appellate courts not only to provide their own an-
swer to questions of law without deference to a lower court, but to do
so without fail.  The practice is somewhat startling on its face simply
because of its universality.  Consider, in contrast, appellate review of
factfinding or discretionary decisions made by lower courts.  In these
contexts the general rule is one of appellate deference.18  It is, how-
ever, only a general rule.  While appellate courts typically do not scru-
tinize, for example, lower courts’ factual determinations, they
occasionally do so.19  Indeed, in certain narrow classes of cases, appel-
18 See generally Chad M. Oldfather, Appellate Courts, Historical Facts, and the Civil-Crimi-
nal Distinction, 57 VAND. L. REV. 437, 444–66 (2004) (describing and critiquing justifications for
deference to trial-level factfinding).
19 See id. at 497–98 (describing a study revealing that appellate courts frequently disregard
factual determinations of the jury in sufficiency-of-the-evidence reviews).
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late courts have the authority to review questions of fact de novo.20
To be sure, there are plausible explanations for this asymmetry of
treatment, including the possibility that it is little more than a product
of appellate courts’ efforts to maximize their power.21  Still, the con-
trast invites reflection on the appropriateness of this disparity.
Some definitions are in order.  Despite their familiarity, neither
“de novo review” nor “questions of law” is a term with clearly defined
content.  “De novo review” is the easier of the two to define.  Also
occasionally referred to as “plenary,” “independent,” or “free” re-
view,22 the core idea is that the appellate court owes no formal defer-
ence to the reasoning or conclusions of the court below.23  This is not
to suggest that the appeals court should not take the lower court’s
reasoning into account,24 that it is free to ignore precedent,25 or that it
may properly reassess a case from top to bottom.26  Instead, the appel-
late court provides its own answer to the question under considera-
tion, the contours of which will be limited by the principles just listed
20 The primary example involves questions of “constitutional fact.” See generally Henry P.
Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229 (1985); see also generally Adam
Hoffman, Note, Corralling Constitutional Fact: De Novo Fact Review in the Federal Appellate
Courts, 50 DUKE L.J. 1427 (2001) (defining and critiquing the version of the constitutional fact
doctrine applied by the Supreme Court).
21 See Charles Alan Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L.
REV. 751, 778–79 (1957) (discussing power maximization and concluding that it is a result of
decisions purportedly in the public interest, not hunger for power).
22 See 1 STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF RE-
VIEW § 2.14 (3d ed. 1999); see also MARY BETH BEAZLEY, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO APPELLATE
ADVOCACY 15 (2d ed. 2006) (“De novo review is sometimes referred to as plenary review be-
cause it allows the court to give a full, or plenary, review to the findings below.”).
23 See 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 22, § 2.14 (“This [appellate] role is more accu-
rately described as one of no particular deference.”); BEAZLEY, supra note 22, at 15 (“When
courts apply the de novo standard, they look at the legal questions as if no one had yet decided
them, giving no deference to legal findings made below.  When this standard is applied, the
reviewing court is willing to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court or the intermediate
court of appeals.”).
24 See Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 232 (1991) (“Independent appellate
review necessarily entails a careful consideration of the district court’s legal analysis, and an
efficient and sensitive appellate court at least will naturally consider this analysis in undertaking
its review.”); cf. 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 22, § 2.14 (“Even de novo review, then,
seems to call for specific and aggressive allegation of error by the appellant, who must also keep
in mind that free review is not strict scrutiny and will lack the skepticism built into that constitu-
tional review test.”).
25 See 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 22, § 2.14 (“[T]he appellate court is acting within
a body of established law binding on it under principles of judicial hierarchy, stare decisis, and
sometimes law of the case.”).
26 See id. (“When the appeals court has full review of a legal issue, it has no license to
venture freely into other issues of fact or the case as a whole.”).
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as well as the state of the record.27  The point is not that the court is
unconstrained, just that it is not constrained by the lower court’s anal-
ysis of that question.28  Thus, de novo review stands in contrast to
more limited standards of review, such as for abuse of discretion,
where the reviewing court’s role is restricted to determining whether
the lower court’s ruling fell within some zone of permissibility.29
As noted, de novo review is typically associated with the review
of legal questions.  While this characterization is largely accurate, it is
misleading.  It implicitly suggests that all legal questions are
equivalent.  In reality, the line between questions of “fact” and ques-
tions of “law” is to a significant degree illusory.30  It is better to imag-
ine a spectrum running from questions of “historical fact” on the one
end to questions about the content of a legal rule on the other,31 with
27 See id. (“[W]hat is meant [by de novo review] is merely appellate power, ability, and
competency to come to a different conclusion on the record as determined below.”); see also,
e.g., Watzek v. Walker, 485 P.2d 3, 6 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1971) (“This Court on appeal will normally
not disturb a trial court judgment if there is any reasonable evidence supporting it.  Yet, in re-
viewing questions of law, we are not bound by the findings of the trial court but are free to draw
our own legal conclusions from the evidence presented.” (citations omitted)).  In this sense it is
distinct from trial de novo as an appeal mechanism. See MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPAR-
ATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 37 (1981) (“[W]e find many other legal systems that use or
have used trial de novo at [sic] the standard mode of appeal.  Where appeal is by trial de novo,
the appellate court simply hears the whole case all over again.  Trial de novo is found in most
nonliterate societies, no doubt in large part because of the difficulty of preserving trial court
findings of fact to serve as a basis for appellate decision.” (citation omitted)).
28 See HARRY T. EDWARDS & LINDA A. ELLIOTT, FEDERAL COURTS STANDARDS OF RE-
VIEW 24 (2007) (“[D]e novo review requires nothing more of an appellate court than that it
decide legal issues as would the first level decisionmaker . . . .  It adds nothing of its own to the
appellate process, but rather simply mandates that an appellate court apply the substantive stan-
dards governing resolution of the legal question at issue.”).
29 The content of the abuse of discretion standard—to the extent it is even appropriate to
speak of a single standard in this context—is considerably more elusive than that of de novo
review. See generally 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 22, § 4.21 (discussing how the abuse of
discretion standard “appears to differ between contexts”).  Still, the standard entails at least
some deference to the trial judge, which implies a range of affirmable rulings, rather than a
single one. See id. (“It is clear, of course, that the abuse of discretion phrase is meant to insulate
the judge’s choice from appellate second-guessing.  It also should be clarified that in most cases
the appellate court may not treat the phrase as equal to an error of law if that is meant to imply
free review; surely some deference is due under an expression of abuse of discretion, and if
indeed independent review is appropriate in certain situations, courts might then say that an
abuse test is not applicable there.”).
30 See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 349 (William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (“Some critics have concluded that ‘law’ cannot be
distinguished analytically from ‘fact.’”); MEADOR ET AL., supra note 6, at 223 (“The distinction
[between questions of law and questions of fact] has bedeviled the courts for decades.  There are,
of course, some clear-cut situations.  But in many instances there is no bright line, and decisions
are difficult to reconcile.”).
31 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 22, § 2.13 (“To be sure, at its outer limit the line is
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a large zone involving the application of legal rules to particular fac-
tual situations in the middle.32  Some portion of the cases in this mid-
dle zone are characterized as mixed questions of law and fact and are
often subject to de novo review.33  For example, the Supreme Court
has charged appellate courts with the responsibility to review punitive
damage awards de novo,34 and has created a somewhat vaguely de-
both clear and uncontroversial: when the appeals court is examining a ‘purely legal’ conclusion,
such as whether the First Amendment can broadly protect gestures or applies to the states, it is
not hard to recognize the court acting in a law-making role . . . .  The other end also may be neat:
what Alice did yesterday is regarded as a pure fact and is usually delegated to the trial court.”);
see also EDWARDS & ELLIOTT, supra note 28, at 7 (articulating further the spectrum spanning
from legal precepts to historical facts).
32 See 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 22, § 2.13 (“In spite of some clarity at wicks’
ends, the area in between these ‘pure’ examples gets increasingly sticky, and the courts cannot
resolve the tricky differences by bare citation to the general rule of appellate lawmaking or by
pointing to the ubiquitous but quixotic law-fact distinction.  An error of law can involve anything
from simple reliance on an overturned case, to a complex mix of the evidence at hand with the
effort to state some substance and guidance that will apply beyond the facts of the particular
case.  The latter mission may be considered lawmaking, but it is not undoubtedly so, and the
appellate court in its action may be either just doing its job or usurping the trial judge’s job.”);
EDWARDS & ELLIOTT, supra note 28, at 8 (“As the labels suggest, mixed findings or mixed
questions generally defy ready categorization as either law or fact.  Consequently, the fact/law
paradigm falters as a method for determining whether appellate review should be de novo or
deferential.”).
33 See BEAZLEY, supra note 22, at 15 (“Courts apply the de novo standard not only to
questions of law, but also to mixed questions of law and fact.  A mixed question of law and fact is
often characterized as a question about whether certain agreed-upon facts meet a legal stan-
dard.”).  Standards of review relating to mixed questions differ from one jurisdiction to the next,
and not for any apparent philosophical or jurisprudential reasoning.  At least one commentator
has argued that “[t]here seems to be no rhyme or reason” to the jurisdictional variations. See
Randall H. Warner, All Mixed Up About Mixed Questions, 7 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 101, 107
(2005).  Others offer explanations grounded in practical and policy considerations. See, e.g., Or-
nelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 700 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that when a mixed
question is presented on appeal, the standard of review “depend[s] upon essentially practical
considerations”); Kent S. Scheidegger, Habeas Corpus, Relitigation, and the Legislative Power, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 888, 905 (1998) (examining three instances of mixed questions and concluding
that the court considered “the choice of the standard of review [to be] a policy question”).  Some
courts and commentators have attempted to articulate guidelines for allocating review authority,
such as by considering whether the question at issue is “primarily” or “essentially” a question of
fact or law and by considering who (judge or jury) is better situated to make the determination.
Warner, supra, at 107, 109–11.  Still other courts have adopted a process of bifurcated review,
pursuant to which the appellate court defers to the trial court’s resolution of the factual aspects
of the issue while allowing for independent review of its legal aspects.  1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS,
supra note 22, § 2.18 (explaining the “split inquiry” and citing two examples: Price v. Wain-
wright, 759 F.2d 1549, 1551 (11th Cir. 1985), and United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195,
1200–01 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc)).
34 See generally 1 JACOB A. STEIN, STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES § 4:47 (3d ed.
1997) (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), as providing “guideposts” for
de novo appellate review of punitive damage awards and, as examples of the application of the
standards, Cont’l Trend Res., Inc. v. Oxy USA, Inc., 101 F.3d 634 (10th Cir. 1996), Lee v. Ed-
316 The George Washington Law Review [Vol. 77:308
fined category of “constitutional fact” issues which are likewise to be
reviewed anew by appellate courts.35  These situations are interesting,
and the justifications for de novo review of such questions overlap to a
large degree with what follows in this Article.  For the sake of clarity,
however, this Article’s analysis will focus on the review of pure legal
issues.  Thus, it posits an appellate court presented with an issue that
requires it to determine the content of a legal standard.  While the
analysis that follows undoubtedly has implications for the practice of
de novo review more generally, it may not apply in all its particulars.
B. The Institutional Functions of Appellate Courts
Appellate courts serve two primary institutional functions—the
correction of error in the initial proceedings,36 and the development of
the law.37  Under most accounts, error correction is the historic basis
wards, 101 F.3d 805 (2d Cir. 1996), Utah Foam Prods. Co. v. Upjohn Co., 930 F. Supp. 513 (D.
Utah 1996), and Rush v. Scott Specialty Gases, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 194 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
35 See generally 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 22, § 2.19 (describing the history and
uncertain application of the constitutional fact category); see also generally Monaghan, supra
note 20, at 238 (describing presuppositions behind constitutional fact review and arguing “that
constitutional fact review at the appellate level is a matter for judicial (and legislative) discre-
tion”).  Generally speaking, constitutional facts are those that implicate constitutional rights and
are to be reviewed de novo in order to ensure the policy objective, among others, of uniform and
effective application of the Constitution. See 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 22, § 2.19
(“[F]actfindings on decisive constitutional questions should be, for party protection and constitu-
tional integrity, left for independent appellate review.”).  For example, in Bose Corp. v. Consum-
ers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 502 (1984), the Court stated that “the
constitutional values protected by the [actual malice] rule make it imperative that
judges . . . make sure that it is correctly applied.”
36 Professor Meador has described this function as requiring the court “[t]o correct error
in the trial proceedings and to insure justice under law to the litigants.” MEADOR ET AL., supra
note 6, at 2.  Professor Meador noted, however, the diminishing dominance of the error-correc-
tion function in the modern court: “This is the historic basis for the intervention of an upper
court.  Though still central to the mission of an appellate system, it is no longer viewed as the
sole or even (in the eyes of some) as the primary purpose.” Id.  Elsewhere, Meador, along with
Professors Carrington and Rosenberg, have observed that “[t]he traditional appeal calls for an
examination of the rulings below to assure that they are correct, or at least within the range of
error the law for sufficient reasons allows the primary decisionmaker.” PAUL D. CARRINGTON,
DANIEL J. MEADOR & MAURICE ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 2 (1976).  In addition, they
emphasize the role of the appeal mechanism in assuring trial judges that their correct decisions
will be endorsed by the larger system and providing similar assurances to the parties and the
public. Id.
37 According to Professor Meador, the lawmaking function requires a court “[t]o enunci-
ate and harmonize the decisional law of the jurisdiction.” MEADOR ET AL., supra note 6, at 2.
This function now occupies a more prominent place both because legal realism undercut the
classic view of courts finding, rather than creating, law, and because the complexity of modern
society requires more law, and more refined law, than legislatures are capable of providing. See
id.  Meador identifies additional functions, including the supervision of trial courts and further-
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for appellate review.38  Although the precise nature of review for error
remains surprisingly underdeveloped, fulfillment of this function is
typically conceived of as involving a focus on ensuring justice between
the immediate parties to the appeal.39  Thus, reversal by an appellate
court is appropriate in such situations as where a trial court has ex-
ceeded the bounds of its discretion, issued a verdict contrary to the
evidence, or applied an inappropriate rule.40  Somewhat less tangibly,
the availability and processes of appellate review provide psychologi-
cal cover for the adjudicative process by spreading decisional respon-
sibility among different judges and over a relatively long period of
time.41  More generally, an appellate court’s correction of an error in
any given case tends to foster an environment in which fewer errors
are committed in the first instance.42
The law declaration function, as its name implies, involves the
articulation and refinement of legal standards through the process of
case-by-case adjudication.  Prior to the Legal Realist movement, when
courts were viewed as engaged in the tasks of finding and declaring,
rather than making, law, this function was regarded as, at best, secon-
dary.43  Now, however, most view it as at least the equal of, if not
ance of the perception of systemic legitimacy. See id. at 2–3; see also ROBERT J. MARTINEAU,
MODERN APPELLATE PRACTICE § 1.10 (1983) (arguing that “[d]oing justice” in both “the indi-
vidual case” and “in the context of the entire legal system” ought to be regarded as a function of
appellate courts).
38 See MEADOR ET AL., supra note 6, at 2. But see Wright, supra note 21, at 779 (“The
controversial question is whether appellate courts have a second function, that of ensuring that
justice is done in a particular case.”).
39 See generally Chad M. Oldfather, The Concept of Error in Civil Appeals (Oct. 16, 2008)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author), for a discussion of the nature of review for error
and a more complete treatment of conceptions of the error correction function.
40 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Craft, 669 A.2d 394, 398 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (Johnson, J.,
concurring) (“As an error-correcting court, we are generally limited to determining whether the
trial judge has committed either an abuse of discretion or an error of law in the handling and
disposition of a case.”).
41 See MEADOR ET AL., supra note 6, at 3 (“[A]n appeal spreads responsibility, thereby
making difficult or sensitive decisions more liveable for the decision makers and the mistakes
more tolerable for all concerned.”); see also SHAPIRO, supra note 27, at 49 (“For appeal allows
the loser to continue to assert his rightness in the abstract without attacking the legitimacy of the
legal system or refusing to obey the trial court.”).
42 See ROSCOE POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 3 (1941) (“That hasty,
unfair or erroneous action may be reversed by a court of review holds back the impulsive, impels
caution, constrains fairness and moves tribunals to keep to the best of their ability in the straight
path.”).
43 See MEADOR ET AL., supra note 6, at 2 (“A recognition of [law making] as a purpose of
appellate review is a product of modern legal realism.  Under the earlier view of courts as simply
finding and declaring the law, this would have been perceived as merely a by-product or an
incidental feature of appellate adjudication.”); see also Paul D. Carrington, The Function of the
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primary to, error correction as a responsibility of an appellate court.44
Its exercise likewise leads to a reduction in errors by trial courts, but
via a process of rule refinement.  As a body of law develops over a
series of cases, it should ideally tend toward greater clarity and cer-
tainty, such that an individual trial court can feel more confident that
it is applying the law in an appropriate manner, and that trial courts
throughout a jurisdiction will do so in a manner consistent with one
another.
Both of these institutional functions are implicated when a court
reviews a legal issue de novo, though not always to the same extent.
A litigant arguing on appeal that the trial court got the law wrong will,
in general, be primarily concerned with having what it perceives to be
an error corrected.45  Unless it is a repeat player, it will not be as con-
cerned with convincing the appellate court to adopt a particular for-
mulation of the governing legal standard as with achieving a favorable
result.  Still, the party’s arguments will often, if not always, push the
court to exercise its law declaration function, because those arguments
will serve as a claim that the court should endorse or, in cases of first
impression, formulate a legal standard different from that applied by
the trial court.46  In turn, because the court’s endorsement or formula-
tion of a standard will serve as precedent in future cases, the court’s
efforts at error correction will often—or, depending on one’s perspec-
tive, always47—result in the creation of law.
It bears noting that universal de novo review is not a necessary
consequence of the exercise of either of these appellate functions.  Im-
agine a regime in which appellate courts reviewed questions of law
Civil Appeal: A Late-Century View, 38 S.C. L. REV. 411, 416 (1987) (observing that at the time of
the creation of the present structure of the federal judiciary “[t]he perceived role of the appellate
court was to correct the errors of the trial court in applying the law to the facts” and “[n]o one
thought appellate courts necessary or useful in making law or policy”).
44 MEADOR ET AL., supra note 6, at 2 (“Some now think of this law enunciating function as
a more important justification for appeals than the error correcting purpose.”); see also Wright,
supra note 21, at 779 (“Everyone agrees, so far as I know, that one function of an appellate court
is to discover and declare—or to make—the law.”).
45 There are exceptions.  Some litigants, such as public interest groups and repeat players,
are often more concerned with convincing the court to articulate a favorable legal standard than
with getting a particular result in the case before the court.
46 This will not always be the case.  If the appellant’s argument is that the trial judge ap-
plied a manifestly incorrect legal standard, such as by rendering a decision pursuant to a case
that has been overruled or a statute that has been repealed, then the claim would implicate only
the error correction function.
47 See Richard S. Arnold, Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS
219, 222–23 (1999) (arguing that virtually every appellate judicial decision requires “a conclusion
of law with precedential significance”).
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under some more deferential standard, such as for abuse of discretion.
An appellate court considering a lower court’s application of a legal
rule would still be reviewing for error.  The difference would lie in the
manner in which error is defined.  Under a system of de novo review,
a lower court’s decision can be characterized as erroneous if it departs
in any way from the appellate court’s preferred rule.48  Appellate re-
versal (and, thus, a determination of error) under a more deferential
standard would typically require some greater departure from the rule
than an appellate court, acting de novo, would adopt by affirming.49
The trial court would, in effect, be given greater latitude to depart
from the appellate court’s ideal formulation of the law before its rul-
ing would be deemed erroneous.  In similar fashion, an appellate deci-
sion rendered pursuant to some more deferential standard could still
create law in a sense consistent with the law declaration function.
Such law would, of course, almost necessarily be more limited in its
reach than law created pursuant to a regime of de novo review.  Even
so, an appellate ruling on whether a trial court’s formulation of a legal
standard fell within its permitted zone of discretion would tell us
something about where the boundaries of that zone are located,
thereby limiting or expanding the authority of future trial judges.
C. Jurisprudential Assumptions
Any legal practice rests on certain understandings regarding the
nature of law and the capacities of the relevant actors in resolving
legal questions.  The goal of this Subsection is to identify some of the
more prominent jurisprudential assumptions underlying universal de
novo review, with an eye toward informing the assessment of the prac-
48 This is not to suggest that trial court departures from the appellate court’s preferred rule
will always be deemed erroneous in the sense that they will result in a reversal of the trial court’s
decision.  “Harmless error” will not result in reversal, but nonetheless remains error. See Chap-
man v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967) (“We conclude that there may be some constitutional
errors which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they
may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the automatic
reversal of the conviction.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 61 (“The court at every stage of the proceeding
must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights
of the parties.”).
49 In the Seventh Circuit, one formulation of the abuse of discretion standard famously
requires that to be overturned the decision under review must “strike [the reviewing court] as
wrong with the force of a five-week-old, unrefrigerated dead fish.”  Parts & Elec. Motors, Inc. v.
Sterling Elec., Inc., 866 F.2d 228, 233 (7th Cir. 1988).  Of course, appellate review for abuse of
discretion “must vary with the nature of the lower court decision.”  Lawson Prods., Inc. v. Avnet,
Inc., 782 F.2d 1429, 1437 (7th Cir. 1986).  “[T]he variety of matters committed to the discretion
of district judges means that the standard is necessarily variable.” EDWARDS & ELLIOT, supra
note 28, at 67.
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tice performed later in this Article.  Those assumptions include the
following: (1) that there are correct answers to legal questions; (2) that
those answers are ascertainable; (3) that those answers are articulable;
and (4) that appellate courts are relatively more competent than trial
courts at ascertaining and articulating those answers.  This list is not
exhaustive,50 but rather is intended simply to expose and highlight the
assumptions underlying the most commonly offered justifications for
de novo review.
1. That There Are Correct Answers to Legal Questions
On its face, the practice of universal de novo review suggests an
understanding of law as determinate, in the sense that there are cor-
rect answers to legal questions—not just to some, many, or most legal
questions, but rather to all legal questions.51  This conclusion seem-
ingly follows from the notion that an appellate court reviewing a trial
court’s determination of a question of law is engaged in a process of
error correction.  Whenever such a court resolves the question in a
manner different from the trial court, it has at least implicitly con-
cluded that the trial court’s resolution of the question was erroneous.
That, in turn, suggests the existence of a “correct” legal answer for the
trial court to have gotten wrong.52  Recall, too, that error correction is
50 As William Lucy has pointed out, the list of things we expect from adjudication is
long—including “impartiality, consistency, predictability, fairness, justice, rationality and legiti-
macy”—and exceedingly difficult to accommodate.  William Lucy, Adjudication, in THE OX-
FORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 206, 206 (Jules Coleman &
Scott Shapiro eds., 2002).  Any judicial practice will rest on some set of understandings with
respect to each of these expectations, which in turn “brings into play many of the central ques-
tions of ancient and contemporary legal and political philosophy.” Id. at 207.
51 See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 24
(1960) (“The deciding is done under an ideology which in older days amounted to a faith that
there is and can be only one single right answer.  This underlies such ideas as ‘finding the law’
and ‘the true’ rule, and ‘the’ just decision.”).
52 I have in mind here something close to full determinacy, which, as Larry Solum defines
it, holds “with respect to a given case if and only if the set of legally acceptable outcomes con-
tains one and only one member.”  Lawrence B. Solum, Indeterminacy, in A COMPANION TO
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 488, 490 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1999).  This includes
both metaphysic and epistemic components—the former relating to whether there is law, the
latter relating to whether it is knowable. See id. at 498 (discussing Ken Kress, A Preface to
Epistemological Indeterminacy, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 134 (1990)).  As Dan Coenen has observed,
the doctrine of de novo review appears based on an understanding that law is determinate in
both senses. See Dan T. Coenen, To Defer or Not to Defer: A Study of Federal Circuit Court
Deference to District Court Rulings on State Law, 73 MINN. L. REV. 899, 911–12 (1989) (“This
accepted approach to the appellate process apparently rests on a shared understanding that law
exists, that the ‘duty’ of judges is ‘to say what the law is,’ and that doctrinal coherence and
fairness for similarly situated litigants demands consistent application of legal rules.  The rule of
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the initial purpose for which appellate review was designed.53  This
implies that the practice of de novo review arose out of a world view
in which all legal questions have correct answers.54  Such an under-
standing is consistent with the traditional story in which inhabitants of
the pre-Realist legal world conceived of law as a “brooding omnipres-
ence” whose answers were to be discovered rather than created.55
Nowadays, we are all Realists, as the saying goes,56 and so the
question becomes whether the practice of universal de novo review
can accommodate a conception of law that acknowledges the exis-
tence of indeterminacy.  Seemingly it can.57  To speak of a correct an-
swer in this context is not necessarily to refer to an answer that is
correct in some objective sense.  The existence of such an answer
would surely be consistent with the regime we are describing.  But we
de novo review, whatever its source, runs deep in our history; independent appellate inquiry into
questions of law has marked our republic’s legal system from its earliest days.” (citations
omitted)).
53 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
54 As Paul Carrington has observed:
A chief concern [in 1891 when the Evarts Act was adopted] seems to have been a
mistrust of the professionalism of the judiciary and of the capacity of individual
judges to apply correctly law that was presumed clear and, thus, amenable to
application . . . .
Such a legal system required an effective appellate system for one reason: The
perceived role of the appellate court was to correct the errors of the trial court in
applying the law to the facts.
Carrington, supra note 43, at 416; see also id. at 423–24 (discussing the formalist assumptions
predominant in 1925).
55 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, 66 U. CHI. L.
REV. 636, 660 (1999) (describing case law arguments in “the debate over formalism,” in particu-
lar “the suggestion, central to legal realism, that the decision how to read ambiguities in law
involves no brooding omnipresence in the sky but is an emphatically human judgment about
policy or principle”).  Of course, as Michael Steven Green points out, this story contains ele-
ments of caricature. See Michael Steven Green, Legal Realism as Theory of Law, 46 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1915, 1984–85 (2005).
56 See, e.g., Green, supra note 55, at 1917 (noting that the assertion that we are all Realists
has been repeated so often “that it has become a cliche´ to call it a ‘cliche´’”); see also Solum,
supra note 52, at 501 (“[T]he indeterminacy debate has made it clear that almost no one defends
a strong formalist claim that the law determines every aspect of the outcome of every case . . . .
If the claim that the law is radically indeterminate turns out to be silly, it is also the case that the
strong formalist claim that the outcomes of cases are completely determined by the law is just as
implausible.”).
57 Indeed, the fact that law declaration is now regarded as one of the twin functions of
appellate courts stands as evidence of broad acceptance of the proposition that law is “un-
derdeterminate.”  Per Solum: “The law is underdeterminate with respect to a given case if and
only if the set of legally acceptable outcomes is a non-identical subset of the set of all possible
results.”  Solum, supra note 52, at 490.  This stands in contrast to indeterminacy, which holds
“with respect to a given case if the set of legally acceptable outcomes is identical with the set of
all possible results.” Id.
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can soften the assumption somewhat and still maintain consistency.
We might mean “correct” in a sense more akin to “less wrong.”  It
may not be, on this view, that we believe that appellate courts have
access to the single, best answer, but rather that they will reach a bet-
ter answer (however “better” is to be measured) than will a trial
judge.  Here, too, an appellate panel can plausibly be described as en-
gaging in error correction when it reverses a trial court ruling.
There are, to be sure, possible explanations for universal de novo
review that do not depend on an assumption that legal questions al-
ways have correct answers in either of these senses.  Instead, as we
will explore below,58 it might be that other considerations—such as
the desirability of finality and consistency, or the simple need to have
some institution that satisfies the demand for law—make it prudent to
act as though there were correct answers to all legal questions even if
we might actually believe otherwise.  This is a variant of the familiar
reasoning that it is often more important to have a question decided
than to have it decided correctly.59
Note, however, the consequences of such an approach.  If we re-
sort to a justification of universal de novo review that does not rely on
the existence of correct answers across the run of issues, we concede
the ability to justify review in those cases on the ground of error cor-
rection.  For example, if there simply were no law governing the ques-
tion before the trial court, then in at least some subset of such cases—
call them the “hard cases”60—it would not be meaningful to speak of
that ruling as having been “erroneous.”61  Thus, if we take at face
58 See infra Part II.
59 See, e.g., Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713, 724 (1865) (“It is almost as
important that the law should be settled permanently, as that it should be settled correctly.”).
60 Commentators have offered various formulations of what might make a case “hard.”
Solum suggests that a hard case is one in which “the outcome is underdetermined by the law in a
manner such that the judge must choose among legally acceptable outcomes in a way that
changes who will be perceived as the ‘winner’ and who the ‘loser.’”  Solum, supra note 52, at 490.
Frederick Schauer enumerates various types of cases that might fall into the category, including
those where applicable rules provide no answer, where the rules provide an answer that conflicts
with the rules’ underlying purposes, where applicable rules provide contradictory answers, and
where the rules provide a clear answer that is consistent with their purpose yet still difficult to
accept.  Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 415 (1985).  I take no position
regarding whether the notion of error correction is inappropriate in the context of every such
case.  I do contend that the notion of error correction probably does not make sense with respect
to, at the very least, some substantial subset of such cases.
61 Judge Richard Posner suggests that this dynamic will be present across an even larger
segment of cases:
There is almost always a zone of reasonableness within which a decision either way
can be defended persuasively, or at least plausibly, using the resources of judicial
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value the assertion that one of the purposes of appellate review is to
ensure that the trial judge applied the correct rules, then in at least
some portion of the cases in which there were no rules it will be mean-
ingless to speak of fulfilling the error correction function.62
Relaxing the nature of the correctness assumption has another
consequence, namely that fulfillment of the error correction function
does not necessarily entail de novo review.  In a world in which there
is a single, correct answer to legal questions, an appellate court must
“find” that answer, then reverse the trial court unless the trial court’s
answer was more or less identical to that found by the appellate court.
But suppose we adopt our relaxed conception of correctness.  Then
imagine a statute, the text of which points one way and the purpose of
which points another, such that there is no clearly correct answer to
the question of its applicability.  A trial court that chose to apply the
statute based on some extraneous factor, such as the economic status
of the defendant, would have committed error.  The same could be
said of a court that reached a permissible result through, say, an evi-
dent (and expressed) misreading of the statute.  Note, however, that
appropriate resolution of such a case from the error-correction per-
spective does not require de novo review.  In these situations appel-
late intervention would be justified under even a less intrusive
standard, whether that be “abuse of discretion,” “clearly erroneous,”
or some other formulation.  Notably, application of those standards
would not require reversal where the trial court’s resolution of the
issue, while not identical to the appellate court’s, was within some
range of adequate correctness.
This latter point suggests that even though we may all be Realists,
the practice of universal de novo review reflects a continuing affinity
for, or at least comfort with, the suggestion that legal questions do
have correct answers.  Indeed, as many commentators have noted, ap-
pellate courts in practice certainly act as though there are correct an-
swers to legal questions.  It is a common observation that appellate
rhetoric.  But the zone can be narrow or wide—narrow when formalist analysis
provides a satisfactory solution, wide when it does not.  Within the zone, a decision
cannot be labeled “right” or “wrong”; truth just is not in the picture.
Richard A. Posner, The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First Century, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1049, 1053
(2006).
62 One could articulate a rule-consequentialist justification for error correction akin to
that developed below in Part II.B, in which fulfillment of the institutional error correction func-
tion would not depend on appellate courts having the ability or opportunity to correct error in
all instances.  The possibility of such a justification does not of course detract from the point that
review in such cases does not itself involve error correction.
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judicial opinions are written in such a way as to depict their conclu-
sions as inevitable.63  Karl Llewellyn referred to this as the “single
right answer” style of judicial opinion.64  Only rarely do courts openly
admit to resolving a legal question on grounds other than its manifest
correctness.65
2. That the Answers to Legal Questions Are Ascertainable
Even if we posit the existence of correct answers to all legal ques-
tions, it does not follow that appellate courts should engage in de novo
review.  It must also be the case that courts are able to reason their
way (or otherwise get to) those correct answers.  Thus, universal de
novo review also appears to rest on the assumption that the answers
to legal questions are ascertainable.66  This, too, follows from the pro-
position that error correction is one of the institutional functions of
appellate courts.  Reaching the conclusion that a lower court’s resolu-
tion of an issue is erroneous requires not only the existence of a right
answer, but also of the capacity to determine what that answer is.
Despite its superficial plausibility, this will often be an unrealistic
assumption.  Consider, for example, a question regarding the appro-
priate interpretation of a statute.  Assume that it is a settled principle
in the jurisdiction that the correct interpretation of a statute is that
which conforms to the intent of the legislature that passed it.  Even if
63 See Dan Simon, A Psychological Model of Judicial Decision Making, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 1,
11 (1998) (“Opinions are overstated, rigid, seemingly inevitable.  The rhetorical style is that of
closure.  The judge is depicted as having little choice in the matter: the decisions are strongly
constrained by the legal materials.” (citations omitted)).
64 See LLEWELLYN, supra note 51, at 26.
65 Perhaps the most prominent example of relatively recent vintage is the “joint opinion”
in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845–46 (1992), in
which Justices O’Connor, Souter, and Kennedy voted to uphold “the essential holding of Roe v.
Wade” “[a]fter considering the fundamental constitutional questions resolved by Roe, principles
of institutional integrity, and the rule of stare decisis . . . .”
66 Thanks to Larry Solum for suggesting this term.  The notion that I am after is akin to
what Ken Kress has called “epistemological indeterminacy.” See Kress, supra note 52, at 138–39.
As Kress draws the distinction:
Metaphysical indeterminacy speaks to whether there is law; epistemic indetermi-
nacy, to whether the law can be known.  We might say that the question of abortion
in a particular jurisdiction is metaphysically (or ontologically) determinate (at some
particular time) if there is a right answer to the question whether a woman has a
right to an abortion in that jurisdiction.  It might nevertheless be epistemically inde-
terminate whether women have that right, because the right answer is not demon-
strable, or because there is no method for determining the right answer, or because
there is great controversy among lawyers or other persons about what that right
answer is.
Id.
2009] Universal De Novo Review 325
we further assume that the question at hand is one as to which the
legislature can meaningfully be regarded as having an intent,67 a court
might not be able to determine what that intent was.68  There might be
no evidence relating to legislative intent on the particular point, or the
evidence might be ambiguous.69  Either way, something stands be-
tween the court and the correct resolution.  We will explore another
possible ascertainability problem in greater detail below, namely that
the nature of case-by-case adjudication will often lead to situations
where a court can ascertain the correct result for the case before it,
but not for the larger range of cases of which it is a part.70
Of course, just as we saw with respect to the assumption that
there are right answers to legal questions, it may be the case that the
ascertainability assumption is a useful fiction, grounded in the idea
that other institutional and systemic considerations make it desirable
to act as though courts can always ascertain the correct answers.
Those considerations will likewise include the need for finality and
consistency.  Here again, though, a failure of the ascertainability as-
sumption to hold across all cases presenting questions of law leads us
to a situation where we cannot rely on error correction to justify the
practice.  From that perspective, though it might be the case that a
trial court got a legal question wrong, the lack of an appellate court’s
ability to accurately ascertain that fact would render the court unable
to fulfill its error correction mission.
3. That Legal Rules Are Articulable
Viewed in light of the institutional functions of appellate courts,
universal de novo review rests on an apparent understanding that le-
gal rules are articulable.71  This holds with respect to both the trial and
appellate courts’ efforts to articulate the law.  In reviewing a trial
court’s ruling on a legal issue, an appellate court necessarily focuses
67 Thus, the situation I posit is distinct from one where the legislature could not have
foreseen that the precise question presented would arise, such as where the question concerns
the applicability of a statute passed in the first half of the nineteenth century to a situation
involving automobiles.  In that situation, again assuming that legislative intent is the established
guidepost for the analysis, it would arguably be more appropriate to regard the question as one
without a correct answer.
68 For a discussion of the problems associated with such a determination, see Jonathan R.
Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism in Administrative Law, 78 B.U. L. Rev. 1023, 1025–32
(1998).
69 See id. at 1026–27.
70 See infra Part II.A.3.
71 For a discussion touching on the articulability of legal rules, see Chad M. Oldfather,
Writing, Cognition, and the Nature of the Judicial Function, 96 GEO. L.J. 1283, 1318–39 (2008).
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on the trial judge’s statements regarding what the law is.  In doing so,
it assumes that the law, as determined by the trial judge, corresponds
to the words the trial judge used to describe it.  This, in turn, depends
on the further assumption that the legal standard on which the trial
judge relied is capable of being more or less fully expressed in words.
In all, an appellate court’s reversal of a trial judge’s legal ruling
amounts to the assertion that the trial judge’s version of the law, as
embodied in the words the judge used to describe that version, is
erroneous.
In making that assertion, of course, the appellate court is simulta-
neously exercising its second function, that of declaring the law.  This,
too, depends on an assumption of articulability.  Put another way, the
use of de novo review in service of the law declaration function de-
pends on courts’ ability to articulate legal rules in sufficient detail or
with sufficient clarity that those rules will adequately bind future
courts to decide in a manner consistent with the present decision.72  If
this were not so—that is, if a court’s declaration of law in Case 1 could
not meaningfully constrain the decisions of courts in Cases 2, 3, or 4—
then there would be little point to the law declaration function.  As
explored in greater detail below, the ability of the court in Case 1 to
articulate law—to create precedent—that binds future courts is neces-
sary in order for rule of law arguments for de novo review to work.  In
other words, if one of the reasons for universal de novo review is to
ensure that like cases are treated alike, and assuming law constrains to
some meaningful degree, then it is desirable to have appellate courts
engage in de novo review on a universal basis because de novo review
gives courts the greatest ability to give content to a legal standard.
That is, more deferential standards of review allow an appellate court
to say nothing more precise than that the lower-level decisionmaker’s
formulation of a rule was within some permissible zone of correctness,
which may not allow for the same degree of control over future deci-
sionmakers.  If, in contrast, a court articulating a rule in Case 1 cannot
thereby impose considerable limits on subsequent courts, then not
only does it become difficult to suggest that error correction is some-
thing other than a simple assertion of power (rather than a device to
72 This is not always a substantial demand in the sense that it requires a lot in the way of
detail.  Vague, inarticulable concepts can be law.  The notion of reasonableness, for example, is a
legal standard that depends for its content on a host of intuitive judgments.  “Articulability”
does not always equate to “precise articulability” or “comprehensive articulability”—the court
can have a loose or vague standard in mind (such as reasonableness), but if it is unable to convey
adequately that standard in words, then the same problems arise.
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ensure adherence to the rule of law), but there would be little point to
the law declaration function.
4. That Appellate Courts Enjoy Advantages Relative to Trial
Courts when It Comes to Resolving Questions of Law
A final assumption underlying the practice of universal de novo
review, and the one most often addressed in prior discussions, is that
appellate courts are advantaged relative to their trial-level counter-
parts when it comes to addressing questions of law.  Upon examina-
tion, this assumption turns out to rest on a number of subsidiary
assumptions falling into two categories.  The first is that appellate
courts are better at answering legal questions than trial courts.  Here,
the focus is on institutional competence.  The second is that universal
de novo review serves systemic ends.  The arguments in this category
are directed more toward the functional advantages that flow from
placing plenary legal authority in appellate courts.  This Subsection
considers the various justifications that have been offered for univer-
sal de novo review of legal questions.  The discussion is limited to con-
sequentialist justifications, which figure most prominently in the
limited literature on the topic, and I accordingly do not consider con-
stitutional or other formalist bases for the practice.73
a. Competence-Based Justifications
The most commonly offered justifications for de novo review
arise out of an understanding that appellate judges—or, at the very
least, appellate courts—are somehow better at “doing law” than trial
judges.  On this view, de novo review of legal determinations serves
73 One could, for example, imagine an originalist defense of the practice akin to the argu-
ment Judge Richard Arnold made against the practice of issuing nonprecedential opinions. See
Arnold, supra note 47, at 225–26.  Arnold argued that the original understanding of the phrase
“judicial power” as used in Article III of the Constitution compels the conclusion that virtually
every decision rendered by an appellate court includes some conclusion of law that has, and
ought to be accorded, precedential significance. Id. at 226.  For a brief time, Arnold’s arguments
had the force of law in the Eighth Circuit. See Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 899
(8th Cir.), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 1054, 1056 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc).  A parallel argument
that the “judicial power” in the case of appellate courts necessarily includes de novo review of
every legal question presented seems plausible, though not without problems.  The judicial sys-
tems in the states as they existed at the framing of the Constitution were very different from the
federal system created in the Judiciary Act of 1789, which in turn became the model for state
judiciaries. See WILFRED J. RITZ, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789, at
5–6, 35–38 (Wythe Holt & L. H. LaRue eds., 1990) (discussing the differences among the sys-
tems).  In similar fashion, one might argue that any right to an appeal includes only a right to
error correction and not a right to law declaration.
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both the error correction function (because appellate judges and
courts are well positioned to determine what the law is and thus to
spot and remedy lower courts’ legal mistakes) and law declaration
function (because appellate judges and courts are most skilled at for-
mulating legal standards and therefore best charged with responsibil-
ity for doing so).  There are three frequently offered competence-
based justifications.
i. Three Heads Are Better than One
The first justification builds off the intuition that there is strength
in numbers and maintains that we can expect appellate courts to be
better at reaching answers to legal questions simply because there are
more judicial minds devoted to the task.74  Such an effect could oper-
ate in two different ways.  It could be a product of the deliberative
process in multimember courts.  On this view, the need to secure two
votes in order to form a majority requires the judges to exchange
viewpoints and information regarding the issues presented, and, per-
haps more significantly, requires them to take the viewpoint of at least
one other person into serious consideration.75  Thus, it is the interac-
tion among the members of the higher court that provides the advan-
tage.  Alternatively, the advantage might simply be a function of
probability, in the sense that if at least two out of three judges agree
on a conclusion, that conclusion is much less likely to deviate from the
“correct” or, perhaps more appropriately, socially acceptable range of
outcomes than is a decision rendered by a single judge.76
74 See FRANK M. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE 58 (1980) (arguing that an appellate
court’s “only claim to superior judgment lies in numbers”); William W. Schwarzer, Defining
Standards of Review, in THE FEDERAL APPELLATE JUDICIARY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
100, 101–02 (Cynthia Harrison & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1989) (arguing that the “claim to
superior judgment . . . lies in numbers, three heads usually being better than one”).
75 See Caminker, supra note 2, at 846–47; Wilfred Feinberg, Unique Customs and Practices
of the Second Circuit, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 297, 300 (1986); Wilfred Feinberg, The Office of Chief
Judge of a Federal Court of Appeals, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 369, 385 (1984).
76 See Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82,
97–98 (1986).  This holds if we assume that the probability of each judge on a panel reaching the
“correct” outcome is greater than chance. Id. at 97.  Relying on the Condorcet Jury Theorem,
Kornhauser and Sager ask us to imagine a jar filled with marbles of only two colors (black and
white), and to consider each judge’s decision to be a draw of a single marble. Id. at 97–98.  If the
marbles are distributed in proportion to the probability of an individual judge reaching the cor-
rect outcome (with white marbles corresponding to the correct outcome and black marbles cor-
responding to an incorrect outcome), then the more draws (i.e., votes), the more likely the
majority of draws will be white (i.e., reflect the correct outcome). Id.  For a thorough analysis of
the appropriateness and limitations of applying the theorem in this context, see Adrian
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Of course, the proper operation of either of these mechanisms
depends on the fulfillment of certain predicate conditions.  Any ad-
vantage derived from interaction requires that there be meaningful
interaction amongst the judges.  This may once have been true; for
example, in the Learned Hand era of appellate adjudication, judges
might have enjoyed not merely additional time to engage in solitary
reflection regarding their cases, but also the opportunity to discuss
and debate the appropriate resolution with their colleagues.77  Nowa-
days, however, such interaction rarely occurs.78  The last several de-
cades have instead witnessed appellate courts at both the federal and
state levels grappling with the “crisis of volume”—the fact that
caseloads have risen at a rate that far outpaces increases in the num-
ber of judges.79  It may be that a small portion of cases receive some-
thing akin to the idealized appellate treatment.80  Most do not.81
In addition, both versions of the justification assume some mini-
mum level of expertise from the participating judges.  This includes
not only general expertise in the form of knowledge about the law, but
also more specific expertise in the form of knowledge about individual
cases and the issues they present.  If the volume-related effects identi-
fied above have also resulted in a situation in which responsibility for
cases falls primarily on one member of an appellate panel, then the
other members of the panel have an incentive to free ride on the case-
specific expertise of their colleague.82  In that instance, it would not be
Vermeule, Many-Minds Arguments in Legal Theory 2–6 (Harvard Law Sch. Pub. Law Research,
Paper No. 08-02, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1087017.
77 See William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New
Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273, 278 (1996)
(describing the emphasis in “the Learned Hand model” on individual contemplation and face-to-
face interaction).
78 Some contend that such interaction never did occur. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER,
HOW JUDGES THINK 2 (2008) (“The difficulty outsiders have in understanding judicial behavior
is due partly to the fact that judges deliberate in secret, though it would be more accurate to say
that the fact that they do not deliberate (by which I mean deliberate collectively) very much is
the real secret.” (citation omitted)); id. at 34 (“Remember that judges do not engage in much
collective deliberation over a case (in fact less than most juries do).”); Peter M. Tiersma, The
Textualization of Precedent, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1187, 1230–31 (arguing that historical
prevalence of unanimous opinions actually evidences less debate among justices); Adam J.
Hirsch, Cognitive Jurisprudence, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 599, 630–32 (2003) (noting multimember
courts’ lack of “collegiality and deliberation” and arguing that more interaction might lead to
qualitatively better lawmaking).
79 See MEADOR ET AL., supra note 6, at 385–419.
80 See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 77, at 296–97.
81 Id. at 295–96.
82 See RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, OPINION WRITING § 3.4 (1990) (commenting on practices
that allow “a one-person opinion to emerge from a multi-judge court”).
330 The George Washington Law Review [Vol. 77:308
the case, in any meaningful sense, that “three heads” were applied to
the problem.  It might also be that all the members of the panel lack
the requisite general or specific expertise because the area of law or
factual context in which the dispute arose is new or unfamiliar.  Inter-
action among those who are novices with respect to a given issue
seems as likely to result in worse results as in better.  The statistical
argument rests on the related assumption that, in the aggregate, the
conclusion that most judges would reach on a given legal question will
be correct or acceptable, which may not hold with respect to some
esoteric subsets of the legal universe.  Moreover, the statistical argu-
ment of course deals in probabilities.  The fact that a three-judge
panel is more likely to reach a correct or generally acceptable result
does not mean that it will reach such a result in any given case.  The
system of course recognizes this, providing not only for an additional
level of review, but also one at which the courts have even more
members.
ii. Appellate Judges as Specialists in Law
The second sense in which commentators suggest that appellate
courts enjoy a competence advantage in resolving legal questions has
to do with expertise.  The core assertion is that since appellate judges
focus their efforts on law, they are likely to be better at resolving legal
issues than trial judges, who must concern themselves with a much
wider array of tasks.83  Simply as a product of repetition and the more
limited nature of their role, the argument runs, appellate judges have
greater experience working with doctrine and thus are arguably more
likely to have a feel for the legal landscape at a broad level, as well as
to be more attentive to how a given decision would fit within the
larger body of law of which it will be a part.  One can imagine that the
relative specialization of appellate judges might lead to resolutions of
legal issues that are somehow “better” in other respects than those
reached by nonspecialists, including trial court judges.84
Yet these advantages may be overstated.  At least in the federal
courts, nothing about the process by which judges are selected or the
terms under which they serve suggests that judges on appellate courts
83 See Ellen E. Sward, Appellate Review of Judicial Fact-Finding, 40 U. KAN. L. REV. 1,
13–14 (1991) (describing the argument, but concluding that the appellate court’s competence
advantage, if any, “is slight”).
84 Viewed in this light, the analysis also suggests the possibility that the “law” specializa-
tion of appellate courts could potentially be a detriment, in much the same way that other spe-
cialized bodies are criticized for reaching suboptimal decisions in some respects.
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are inherently more competent than trial judges at resolving legal is-
sues.85  And although it is likely that appellate judges develop an ad-
vantage through experience,86 that is not necessarily so.  As a general
proposition, an issue cannot be raised on appeal unless it was first
presented to the trial court,87 and not every issue raised at the trial
level is appealed.  In absolute terms, then, trial judges must make
more legal determinations than appellate judges, and, more generally,
there is reason to believe that courts at both levels “address the same
kinds of substantive legal issues in roughly comparable proportions.”88
Even if we concede a general appellate advantage in resolving legal
questions, we must remain mindful that it is merely a generalization
that will not hold in every case.  A trial judge in a given case may have
relevant subject-matter expertise that members of the appellate panel
lack.  Or, in the case of new statutory schemes or the application of
existing legal standards to new technologies, none of the judges may
have relevant preexisting subject-matter expertise, and any general
advantage enjoyed by the appellate judges in terms of crafting rules or
otherwise doing pure legal analysis might be outweighed by the supe-
rior perspective enjoyed by the trial court by virtue of being closer to
the facts of the case at hand.89
iii. Appellate Courts as Structurally Advantaged
A third potential source of a competence differential between
trial and appellate courts stems from the possibility that appellate
courts enjoy certain advantages that are products of institutional ar-
chitecture.  The design of the appellate process facilitates a focus on
law.  In any given appeal, only a small number of issues are under
consideration, as compared to the potential multitude of factual, legal,
and case management issues that are before the trial court in a case.
Thus, the energies not only of the judges, but also of the parties, are
focused exclusively on those issues.  As a consequence, the appellate
85 See Caminker, supra note 2, at 845–46.
86 Id. at 846 (“District courts deal primarily with case management and factfinding and
have thus developed expertise in these areas.  By contrast, both tiers of appellate courts deal
primarily with legal issues and have thus developed a corresponding expertise.  The assignment
of different primary tasks and its effect on procedures and experience thus ensure that appellate
court legal rulings are likely to be ‘better’ than district court rulings.” (citations omitted)).
87 See EDWARDS & ELLIOTT, supra note 28, at 76.
88 Caminker, supra note 2, at 846 n.117.
89 This is not to suggest that being closer to the facts will generally position a court to
make superior legal determinations.  In fact, as explored in greater detail in the next subpart, the
opposite is probably true.
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court has the advantage of briefing that is more focused on, and there-
fore more developed as to, the particular issues in dispute than likely
was the case in the trial court.  In addition, the court often has the
benefit of the trial judge’s input on the question.  Finally, appellate
decisionmaking takes place at something of a remove from the dis-
pute.  To the appellate judge, the record is “cold”—the parties will, at
most, make a brief but mute appearance at oral argument, and testi-
mony is words on a page—which facilitates dispassionate review.90  In
general, then, we might expect that appellate courts will be better
positioned to resolve legal questions than their trial-level
counterparts.
But we must not overstate the extent of this advantage.  At least
with respect to some sorts of legal questions, there is reason to ques-
tion the assumption that attention to a problem correlates with quality
of resolution.91  And the parties, who are of course focused on winning
a particular dispute rather than on shaping a general legal standard,
will not necessarily provide the input required for ideal generation of
a rule of law.92  Design features might result in a general appellate
court advantage over trial courts when it comes to resolving legal
questions and developing law, but that advantage is neither universal
nor uniform.  In many cases the structural advantage enjoyed by the
appellate court will be slight, and its capabilities will fall far short of
the norm.  Indeed, the trial judge’s immersion in the facts of the case
may sometimes provide her with a better sense of the context in which
an issue arose and is likely to arise again.  In these situations the ap-
pellate court could be at a lawmaking (and, for that matter, error cor-
rection) disadvantage.
b. De Novo Review as Necessary to Satisfy Systemic Needs
A second source of justification for universal de novo review is
the need for an institution that can both generate legal standards and
90 See, e.g., Robert C. Owen & Melissa Mather, Thawing Out the “Cold Record”: Some
Thoughts on How Videotaped Records May Affect Traditional Standards of Deference on Direct
and Collateral Review, 2 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 411, 412 (2000) (observing the perceived
relationship between the “cold” record and “reasoned decisionmaking”); see also LESTER BERN-
HARDT ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMERICA 85 (1939) (“The cold printed record inevita-
bly must give an incomplete and sometimes distorted picture of the case.”).
91 Cf. Oldfather, supra note 71, at 1312–14 (exploring the “Unconscious Thought Theory”
in the context of a broader survey of psychological research, suggesting that attempts to provide
written justifications for decisions may negatively affect the quality of the underlying decision).
92 This is one of the central critiques offered by advocates of the “public law” model of
adjudication.  For a brief overview, see Chad M. Oldfather, Remedying Judicial Inactivism: Opin-
ions as Informational Regulation, 58 FLA. L. REV. 743, 752–54 (2006).
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ensure that those standards are consistently implemented.  Under this
approach, the practice makes sense not because appellate judges and
courts are necessarily better at resolving legal questions, but rather
because it seemingly follows from the nature of our judicial system.
Such a justification could take the following two forms.
i. Ensuring Equality and Predictability Through Precedent
A fundamental tenet of the American legal system is that like
cases should be treated alike.93  This is valuable in at least two re-
spects.  The first is that we value equal treatment under law.94  Those
who are similarly situated ought to be similarly treated.  The second is
that uniformity promotes predictability, which, in turn, protects reli-
ance interests and allows parties to comply with the law.95  Only when
those subject to the legal system know that they will be treated in a
manner consistent with those who have preceded them can they struc-
ture their affairs with confidence.96  That, in turn, reduces the opera-
tional costs of the legal system, because informed actors will commit
fewer violations.97  Moreover, the ability to regard prior applications
of legal standards as binding on present disputes reduces the cost of
adjudicating those violations that do occur as compared to a regime in
which each case is determined anew.98  In addition, consistency in the
resolution of cases promotes respect for the judiciary by strengthening
the perception that judicial decisions are not influenced by political or
other extralegal considerations.99
These concepts are operationalized through the mechanism of
precedent, by which later courts are bound to some greater or lesser
degree to follow the decisions of their predecessors.  The asserted con-
nection to universal de novo review is that the process allows for the
fullest implementation of precedent.  De novo review, coupled with
vertical and horizontal precedent (i.e., a system where lower courts
are absolutely bound by the decisions of higher courts, and higher
courts are bound by their own prior decisions), serves to further the
goal of equality by enabling appellate courts to formulate a rule of law
that, by virtue of being binding on subsequent courts, must be consist-
93 This idea can be traced back at least to Aristotle.  David J. Seipp, Our Law, Their Law,
History, and the Citation of Foreign Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1417, 1437–38 (2006).
94 See Caminker, supra note 2, at 852.
95 See id. at 850–51.
96 Id. at 851.
97 Id.
98 See id. at 851–52.
99 See id. at 852–53.
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ently applied in all future cases.  At the same time, de novo review
allows the appellate court to ensure that any given case before it was
decided in a manner consistent with past cases, because de novo re-
view gives the appellate court full authority to police the trial court’s
interpretation and implementation of the legal standards involved.
Only if we allow appellate courts to revisit thoroughly every legal de-
termination made by lower courts can we ensure that, among other
things, the same legal standard is being applied in every case to which
it is applicable and that the standard adequately accounts for all of the
features of a case that ought to factor into its disposition.100  On this
view, de novo review is necessary to complete fulfillment of both the
error correction and law declaration functions, because only through
plenary consideration can an appellate court ensure that the trial
court has applied the appropriate standard in a manner consistent
with past courts (i.e., error correction), while also increasing the likeli-
hood that future courts will likewise do so (i.e., law declaration or
refinement).  Here, we see all of the previously identified assumptions
underlying universal de novo review in operation.  Regardless of
whether there is a “correct” answer in some abstract sense the first
time a court confronts a truly novel legal issue, the ideal of compliance
with precedent provides at least one criterion for correctness in subse-
quent cases—namely, that they be decided in a manner that is consis-
tent with past adjudication.  The process likewise assumes that the
appellate court will be able to identify departures from precedent—
that is, that it will be able to ascertain the true content of the law and
measure the standard applied by the trial court in the case before it
against that standard—and that it will be able to articulate the differ-
ences, if any, in such a way as to lessen the likelihood of such depar-
tures by future courts.
As the preceding paragraph suggests, however, the analysis takes
on a different cast in cases where there is no established rule of law.  If
a trial court makes a legal ruling on an open question, the failure by
an appellate court to review that ruling, whether in a plenary sense or
at all, would leave the ruling’s “correctness” unverified.  From that
follows the possibility that the next court to confront the case would
resolve the legal question in a diametrically opposed way.  This sort of
variance could continue until an appellate court steps in to make law.
What results is undoubtedly nonuniformity, but of a different nature
100 See Sward, supra note 83, at 14.  Here we see the operationalization of the assumptions
that law is both ascertainable and articulable.
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than what would result from an appellate court’s failure to review a
case involving a nonnovel issue.
Brief consideration of relevant practices reveals that we are will-
ing to tolerate such nonuniformity and establishes that, although en-
suring uniformity and predictability are important goals, they are not
unqualified.101  We are at least occasionally willing to tolerate
nonuniform treatment along two dimensions.  The most familiar ex-
ample occurs when a court overrules one of its prior decisions,
thereby treating litigants after the overruling differently from those
who came before.  A related dynamic exists where a court recognizes
a new right, thereby creating a class of prospective litigants that did
not previously exist and affording them treatment different from that
of their similarly situated predecessors.  Moreover, and most pertinent
to this Article’s inquiry, our system effectively precludes lawmaking
and thus allows precisely the sort of nonuniformity contemplated in
the preceding paragraph, with respect to the sorts of legal rulings that
are unlikely to be the subject of an appeal.  To take just one example,
federal district court interpretations of the rules relating to discovery
are unlikely to be subject to appellate review.102  The same holds with
respect to most pretrial rulings that do not result in a final judg-
ment.103  The relative unavailability of interlocutory appeals in the
federal system ensures this result.104
The second dimension along which we are willing to tolerate
nonuniformity is geographic.  The Supreme Court has no obligation to
resolve circuit splits, and as a consequence the law can differ from one
part of the country to the next.  Indeed, the federal structure presup-
poses such geographic variation and, on the view of states as “labora-
tories of democracy,” celebrates such nonuniformity as a positive
feature.105
101 Cf. Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction, 24 J. LEGAL
STUD. 379, 425 (1995) (questioning the value of harmonization of law); Amanda Frost,
(Over)valuing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (questioning the inherent and
practical value of uniformity in the interpretation of law).
102 See STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 628 (6th ed. 2004) (“Discovery and the
pretrial process now dominate the procedural landscape.  Most rulings entered at this stage do
not immediately produce final judgments, and many will never produce final judgments because




105 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
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ii. Satisfying the Demand for Law
A related, though somewhat more practical, justification for uni-
versal de novo review is that the practice provides the most expedient
way to satisfy the demand for legal standards.  The past half century
or so has witnessed a tremendous increase in the reach of the law and
the amount of legal disputation.106  In some respects, this has arguably
led to too much law, both in the sense that one could reasonably be-
lieve that the law has extended too far in the scope of what it governs,
and as evidenced by the distinct belief that there are too many judicial
decisions that, while perhaps technically creating law, fail to add
meaningfully to the law in a broader sense, instead creating confusion
and needless difficulty.107  Whatever the merits of these complaints,
there remain many areas in which, whether as a product of the in-
creased scope of the law, technological change, or some other factor,
there are many unsettled legal questions.108  Here, the problem is that
there is too little law rather than too much.  As a result, one might
argue that universal de novo review is necessary in order for appellate
courts to satisfy the demand for legal standards.
Such an argument flows almost inevitably from the fact that the
articulation and refinement of legal standards is simply part of the
institutional function of appellate courts.109  But the point here is not
to rehearse the suggestions outlined above to the effect that appellate
courts are especially good at doing law.  It is instead to approach the
question from a slightly different angle, which results in a variant of
the same point.  It may not be that we find the justification for de
novo review located in appellate courts’ attributes viewed in isolation,
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the
rest of the country.”).
106 See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM
53–123 (1996) (describing and attempting to explain, based in part on the increased amount of
law, the tremendous growth in caseloads in the federal courts).
107 The view that such decisions are problematic is surprisingly long-lived. See John P. Bor-
ger & Chad M. Oldfather, Anastasoff v. United States and the Debate over Unpublished Opin-
ions, 36 TORT & INS. L.J. 899, 900–04 (2001).
108 See POSNER, supra note 106, at 166 (“Despite the vast number of published opinions,
most federal circuit judges will confess that a surprising fraction of federal appeals, at least in
civil cases, are difficult to decide not because there are too many precedents but because there
are too few on point.”).
109 Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 112 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James
McClellan eds., 1990) (“To avoid the confusion which would unavoidably result from the contra-
dictory decisions of a number of independent judicatories, all nations have found it necessary to
establish one court paramount to the rest . . . [t]o settle and declare in the last resort, a uniform
rule of civil justice.”).
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but that we do so in comparison with the relative deficiencies of trial
courts in making law.110  On this view, appellate courts are charged
with making law not because they are somehow uniquely suited to do
so, but instead because we need some institution to serve that func-
tion, and trial courts are relatively unsuited to do so.111  After all, the
uniformity and predictability benefits associated with de novo review
could largely be achieved simply by giving horizontal precedential ef-
fect to district court decisions.  Such a regime would not generate uni-
formity to quite the same geographic extent—at the federal level,
there are often substantial differences in the geographic reach of rul-
ings of individual district courts versus circuit courts.  It would, how-
ever, mitigate the concern to some extent, and extending the
precedential reach of decisions beyond the territorial bounds of a
given district would do so to an even greater degree.  Although this
suggests that the bases for the rule arise to a greater extent out of
considerations of competence than out of concern for uniformity and
predictability, it is nonetheless true that such a regime would be oper-
ationally different from what we currently employ.
Even if we accept the claim that it is structurally appropriate to
vest lawmaking authority in appellate courts, it does not follow that
such authority must be implemented via de novo review.  A decision
rendered pursuant to some more deferential standard, such as abuse
of discretion, can still create law.  Of course, law generated in such a
regime will almost necessarily be more limited in scope, because a
court charged with responsibility for determining whether a trial judge
abused her discretion will not be able to prescribe future judges’ con-
duct quite as tightly as a court that has the authority to completely
displace the trial judge’s ruling with its own.  But it is nonetheless the
case that an appellate court in concluding that a trial judge did or did
not abuse her discretion will generate a holding that can limit or ex-
pand the authority of future trial judges, and thus create law.  De novo
review certainly provides a relatively efficient mechanism for doing
so—at least insofar as subsequent courts are willing to take an expan-
sive view of a prior court’s holding (i.e., to be receptive to attaching
significance to the prior court’s language rather than simply its ratio
110 See, e.g., Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., A Trial Judge’s Freedom and Responsibility, 65
HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1297–98 (1952) (noting that, in trial courts, “the pace is quicker, the troub-
lesome issues have not been sorted from those which go by rote, the briefs of counsel have not
reached their ultimate perfection”).
111 But see Caminker, supra note 2, at 826–28 (imagining a system in which lower courts are
not bound by the legal determinations of higher courts).
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decidendi).112  An appellate court is able to make a much stronger
statement about the content of the law when it is empowered to create
from scratch its own answer to the “what is the law” question, and
when subsequent trial courts know that the appellate court will like-
wise have the ability to reconsider and reverse their decisions that do
not conform with the standard articulated by the appeals court.  Even
so, while such an approach may be, in general, preferable, it is not
necessary.
II. Questioning Universal De Novo Review
In exploring the assumptions underlying universal de novo re-
view, the preceding Part suggested some reasons why those assump-
tions might not hold true.  This Part takes up a more generalized
analysis of the practice in consequentialist terms.  Roughly stated,
such an inquiry involves an assessment of whether the benefits of uni-
versal de novo review outweigh its associated costs.113  The analysis in
this Part first takes up the question of  whether universal de novo re-
view might be justified on act-consequentialist grounds—that is,
whether de novo review can be justified with respect to any instance
in which an appellate court faces a question of law.114  Put another
way, it considers whether it is possible to conclude that the benefits of
de novo review will outweigh its costs in any and every such case.
Having concluded that act-consequentialism cannot provide a justifi-
cation for the universality of de novo review, it next takes up the pos-
sibility of a rule-consequentialist justification for the practice.115  That
is, it considers whether the universality of de novo review makes sense
112 In reality, it seems likely that, as Karl Llewellyn pointed out, lawyers and judges vacil-
late between these two views of the force of precedent as necessary to suit their purpose in a
given case. See KARL NICKERSON LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 66–69 (1960); see also Wal-
ter V. Schaefer, Precedent and Policy, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 12–16 (1966) (outlining various
factors that will affect the extent to which a decision is given precedential effect by subsequent
courts).
113 See Brad Hooker, Rule Consequentialism, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSO-
PHY para. 1 (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2008), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/conse
quentialism-rule/ (describing rule-consequentialism as a theory by which morality of a rule is
judged “solely in terms of the goodness of [its] consequences” rather than in terms of the rule
itself in the abstract).
114 See id. para. 4 (describing an act-consequentialist decision procedure as requiring that,
“[o]n each occasion, an agent should decide what to do by calculating which act would produce
the most good”).
115 Under a rule-consequentialist decision procedure, “[a]t least normally, agents should
decide what to do by applying rules whose acceptance will produce the best consequences . . . .”
Id.  Adrian Vermeule defines the distinction in a similar way. See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 5 (2006).
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as a rule despite the fact that not every application of the rule is opti-
mal.  Rule-consequentialism, we will see, provides a more promis-
ing—though ultimately questionable—basis for the practice.
A. The Failure of an Act-Consequentialist Justification
As the discussion in the preceding Part revealed, even if we ac-
cept the existence of correct answers to legal questions, none of the
remaining assumptions underlying universal de novo review will hold
in every case.  That is, even if we posit the existence of a correct an-
swer to any given legal question, that answer may not be either ascer-
tainable or articulable for reasons having to do with some generalized
shortcomings of language, cognition, or the ability to resolve questions
of historical fact, or for reasons particular to the specific court con-
fronting the issues.  Thus, none of the justifications standing alone can
provide the basis for universal de novo review.  For the practice to
make sense in act-consequentialist terms, then, it must be the case that
at least one of this cluster of justifications holds in every case, and that
no major negative consequences will result from plenary appellate re-
view.  The former seems unlikely and, as this Part demonstrates, the
latter is unrealistic.
Any implementation of de novo review in cases presenting novel
legal issues involves an act of lawmaking.  Resolution of such an issue
necessarily results in precedent that will bind future courts.116  The pri-
mary affirmative critique of universal de novo review is that it will
lead appellate courts to make affirmatively bad law because the prac-
tice effectively forces courts to issue precedential decisions in cases
where it would be inadvisable to do so.  Intermediate appellate courts
116 Of course, the effects outlined in this Section will vary somewhat depending upon just
how much present courts are constrained by past decisions.  Some have suggested that stare
decisis does not, or at least should not, provide much of a constraint at all. See, e.g., Michael
Stokes Paulsen, Does the Supreme Court’s Current Doctrine of Stare Decisis Require Adherence
to the Supreme Court’s Current Doctrine of Stare Decisis?, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1165, 1166 n.3 (2008)
(enumerating works in which Paulsen has questioned the doctrine of stare decisis in constitu-
tional law).  If we were to do away with precedent as any sort of formal constraint on judicial
decisionmaking (with it still providing some amount of logical constraint), then we are left with
error-correction-based rationales for de novo review, which are in turn rooted in the assump-
tions about institutional competence that I have called into question above, and which counsel
against universal de novo review.  On the other hand, if we have a strong doctrine of stare
decisis, pursuant to which precedents clearly bind and are difficult to dislodge, then the resulting
high costs of an erroneous initial decision likewise counsel against universal de novo review.
Viewed from this angle, then, probably the strongest case for universal de novo review occurs
where the binding nature of precedent is somewhere in the middle, such that bad precedents are
relatively easy to distinguish or overrule.
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occupy a position in the world pursuant to which they have mandatory
jurisdiction, an obligation to correct errors made at the trial level, and
the power to bind themselves and all the trial courts within their juris-
diction by their pronouncements.117  But, as demonstrated above, fea-
tures of a particular case, or of the appellate panel confronting that
case, will, at least occasionally, render it an inappropriate vehicle for
the creation or refinement of a legal standard that will necessarily gov-
ern future cases.  It is not so much that legal rules generated in these
situations will fail to produce equality and predictability, though one
can imagine that happening if the rule is poorly crafted, but rather
that the rules will be substantively worse than those that would be
generated in a more appropriate case.118
There are at least three respects in which a given case may pre-
sent an undesirable vehicle for making law.  The first two follow from
the discussion in the preceding Part, in that they represent failures of
the mechanisms thought to provide appellate courts an advantage
with respect to legal questions.  First, there may be a failure of the
adversary process, such that the court does not receive the input nec-
essary to support quality lawmaking.  Second, the members of the
panel may lack some portion of the expertise necessary to create law
in an appropriate fashion.  The third is somewhat distinct, in that it
stems not as much from a failure of process as from the happenstance
of fact.  Here, the potential problem is that the case before the court
may arise from an atypical set of facts, which might in turn lead the
court to make “bad” law in the sense that it will render its decision
supposing the case to be more representative of the class of cases in
which a prospective legal rule will apply than it really is.  These poten-
tial shortcomings might also occur in combination, and undoubtedly
overlap to some extent.  Still, it is useful to consider them individually.
1. Failures of the Adversary Process
Our system of adjudication is fundamentally adversarial.  In the
classic model of the process, the judge’s role is largely reactive.  As
characterized by Lon Fuller, “the distinguishing characteristic of adju-
dication lies in the fact that it confers on the affected party a peculiar
117 See Jeffrey O. Cooper & Douglas A. Berman, Passive Virtues and Casual Vices in the
Federal Courts of Appeals, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 685, 721–22 (2000).
118 I am going to assume that it is meaningful to talk about “better” and “worse” legal rules
and resolutions of cases and will do so without staking any claim as to the identity of the criteria
based on which to make the distinction.  That said, the discussion that follows will necessarily
touch on some ways in which a rule might be suboptimal.
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form of participation in the decision, that of presenting proofs and
reasoned arguments for a decision in his favor.”119  For Fuller, any fea-
ture of an adjudicative regime that adversely affects the significance of
party participation threatens the system’s integrity.120  As a result,
Fuller contends that the judge should remain passive and strive to de-
cide cases as completely as possible on the terms identified by the
parties.121
One of the primary critiques of the classic model of adjudication
is that it falsely envisions a world in which the only interests affected
by any act of adjudication are those of the parties before the court.
As proponents of the public law model of adjudication pointed out,
many lawsuits directly affect people and institutions who are not par-
ties and who thus do not enjoy the participatory right upon which
Fuller grounded his theory.122  The paradigm public law case involves
a claim demanding structural or institutional reform, for example of a
school or prison system.123  Because the parties’ interests in such cases
will often not be coextensive with the interests of everyone who will
be affected by the case’s resolution, commentators have called for a
more proactive role for the judge.124  In such cases, they argued,
judges must actively participate in shaping the litigation, even to the
point of acting “to construct a broader representational framework”
by appointing masters, involving experts, and the like.125
Despite these divergent conceptions of adjudication and the ap-
propriate scope of the judicial role therein, even the proponents of the
public law model conceded the need to credit party participation for
the simple reason that the parties will have the greatest incentive—
wanting to win—to provide the court with the information it needs to
render a decision.126  But the parties’ incentive to provide the court
119 Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 364 (1978).
120 See id.
121 See id. at 385–86; see also STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 2–3 (1984)
(describing arguments for a “neutral and passive decision maker”).
122 See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281, 1284 (1976) (noting examples of cases affecting nonparties, including cases involving
school desegregation, employment discrimination, prisoners’ rights, antitrust, securities fraud,
bankruptcy, union governance, consumer fraud, housing discrimination, electoral reapportion-
ment, and environmental management).
123 See id. For an overview of the public law model, see Oldfather, supra note 11, at
145–49.
124 See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term—Foreword: The Forms of Jus-
tice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 26 (1979).
125 See id.
126 See Oldfather, supra note 11, at 152–53.  For a thorough consideration of the signifi-
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with the necessary input is subject to an important qualification.  A
party’s incentive extends only so far as to provide the court with infor-
mation that will lead the court to rule in favor of that party in the
specific case before the court.  This does not necessarily, or perhaps
even usually, mean that the parties will provide the court with the
quasi-legislative inputs that must underlie the formulation of a legal
rule.  Suppose, for example, that the formulation of an appropriate
rule depends on an assessment of the incentives the rule will create for
those who are potentially subject to it.  A court’s decision whether to
impose a duty in tort, for example, will likely depend at least in part
on an assessment of the extent to which such a duty would create in-
centives for certain categories of actors—manufacturers, or retailers,
or landlords—to take appropriate precautions over a broad range of
situations.  A party might find it useful to present incentive-related
arguments to the court, but its focus on winning this case may lead it
not to do so.  And even where the parties do make such arguments,
there is no reason to believe they will make them with the same scope
and at the same level of generality as would parties arguing solely
over the formulation of a general rule with no specific dispute at
stake.
The analysis in the preceding paragraph rests on an assumption
that suggests another way in which the process might fail—namely,
that the lawyers before the court will consistently perform to some
minimum level of competence.  Anyone who has seen the appellate
process up close, however, knows that counsel often fall short of any
such standard.  Whether because of a lack of effort or skill, or because
the economics of a given case simply do not support it, appellate briefs
frequently fail to give the court the input necessary to support in-
formed lawmaking.127
In sum, the exercise of de novo review in a given case may not
make sense in consequentialist terms because the adversarial process
will at least occasionally provide courts with inadequate inputs based
on which to make law.
2. Failures of Judicial Expertise
Another reason a given case might serve as a poor vehicle for
lawmaking has to do with the composition of the court itself.  Simply
cance of participation, see Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181,
273–305 (2004).
127 For tongue-in-cheek support of poor appellate lawyering, with examples, see Alex
Kozinski, The Wrong Stuff, 1992 BYU L. REV. 325, 326–33.
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put, the subject matter of a case will at least occasionally lie outside
the expertise of the judges on the panel.  This could happen in two
ways.  First, the factual context out of which the dispute arises may be
unfamiliar.  It is no stretch to imagine, for example, an appellate panel
composed entirely of judges who are unable to appreciate the nuances
of a dispute that hinges on the details of some complex technology.128
A court lacking such an appreciation could easily misstep in fashion-
ing a legal standard that will guide the use of that technology.  The
second type of failure of expertise relates to the governing law itself.
Some areas of the law may have become so complex that judges lack-
ing subject-matter expertise feel uncomfortable creating law in
them.129
There is some evidence suggesting that these possibilities are not
mere speculation.  In a study of the Third Circuit’s use of judgment
orders—that is, affirmances without opinion—Professors Gulati and
McCauliff concluded that the circuit’s practice was consistent with the
intent to avoid resolving novel and complex questions of securities
law.130  Such a practice, of course, demonstrates judicial awareness of
the potential for a lack of expertise and, as explored in greater detail
below, is arguably desirable.131  But prevailing conceptions of the judi-
cial role do not allow for such avoidance as a matter of course.132  In
most instances in which courts confront unfamiliar territory, then,
they will end up making law, and a failure to appreciate either the
factual or legal context in which the dispute arises will often—via
128 Cf., e.g., Ryan S. Goldstein et al., Specialized IP Trial Courts Around the World, INTELL.
PROP. & TECH. L.J., Oct. 2006, at 1, 1 (“The Federal Circuit, which has subject matter jurisdic-
tion over patent, trademark, US International Trade Commission, and other cases, was formed
to have the type of specialized expertise necessary to adjudicate intellectual property cases and
provide guidance to lower courts through its opinions.”); see also id. at 3–4 (describing argu-
ments for and against specialized courts).
129 Cf., e.g., Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Preventive Tax Policy: Chief Justice Roger J. Traynor’s Tax
Philosophy, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 877, 879 (2008) (“When Congress established the [predecessor to
the federal Tax Court] . . . it initially considered it a technical, tax expert tribunal . . . .” (citation
omitted)). One response to the argument that the judges on a given panel might lack the subject
matter expertise to resolve a complex, specialized issue could be that such a possibility is con-
trary to the very nature of law.  That is, that ideals such as “rule of law and not of men” presup-
pose a body of law that is accessible to and understandable by not only those with legal training
but also to educated laypersons.  On this view, there neither can nor should be questions of law
that are amenable to resolution only by judges possessing an appropriate base of specialized
knowledge.
130 See Mitu Gulati & C.M.A. McCauliff, On Not Making Law, 61 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 157, 162, 173–74 (1998).
131 See infra Part II.A.3.
132 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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mechanisms explored in the next Subsection—lead the court to do so
in a less than ideal way.
3. Factual Atypicality
The third sense in which de novo review may lead to the counter-
productive exercise of appellate lawmaking authority arises out of an
inherent feature of case-by-case lawmaking—namely, its consistent fo-
cus on a single case.  Even where the parties have done their job, and
the court suffers from no general deficit in expertise, the court may be
led astray based on a lack of knowledge concerning the representa-
tiveness of the factual setting presented by the case before it.  If a
court misjudges representativeness, it will create law that does not
“fit” the world to which it will apply.
Rules are necessarily based on understandings regarding how
they will affect those who are governed by them, which in turn re-
quires an appreciation of who will be governed by them and in what
circumstances.  Judges faced with a single dispute may not be well
positioned to assess either.  A court formulating a doctrine of tort law
must consider how its doctrine will affect the behavior of potential
plaintiffs and defendants and shape the rule accordingly.  A court in-
terpreting a statute in light of the statute’s purpose should likewise
consider how effective varying interpretive possibilities will be in fur-
thering that purpose.  In so doing, the court will be engaged in “legis-
lative factfinding”: determining “facts that transcend the litigation
before the court and are relevant to legal reasoning and the fashioning
of legal rules.”133  To a great degree, this sort of “factfinding” involves
relatively little finding of facts and a relatively large amount of specu-
lation.134  The underlying questions are, at least in theory, factual.  Dif-
fering rules will, in application, have differing consequences.  But
determining what those consequences actually will be presents a
largely unachievable task.  As a result, a great deal of lawmaking is
133 Peter J. Smith, New Legal Fictions, 95 GEO. L.J. 1435, 1468 (2007).
134 Adrian Vermeule characterizes these sorts of questions as “‘trans-scientific’: although
they are empirical in principle, they are unresolvable at acceptable cost within any reasonable
time frame.” VERMEULE, supra note 115, at 3.  Vermeule reasons:
It may be that the costs of acquiring the data needed to answer the empirical ques-
tions are prohibitive or at least greater than the benefits to be gained from choosing
the best interpretive doctrine.  It may also be, more simply, that the needed data
cannot be obtained (or at least not obtained in full) at any cost, because uncertainty
is objective and irreducible.
Id. at 158.
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based on, at best, partially informed assumptions about
consequences.135
As stated so far, this problem is not unique to the judiciary.  Leg-
islatures and administrative agencies must likewise make law in the
face of empirical uncertainty.  What distinguishes the judiciary is that,
to a significant degree, it lacks the option to decline to decide.136  Leg-
islatures and agencies faced with a lack of information can simply
choose not to act in the hopes that time will provide the necessary
factual basis on which to make law in the future.  Judges, in contrast,
must declare a winner in the lawsuit before them.137  It is occasionally
appropriate for a court to do so without creating law going to the mer-
its of the suit, such as by resorting to one of the various justiciability
doctrines.138  But more often the court will have to commit to some
version of the law under which the plaintiff does or does not have a
claim.  In those instances, a court has some discretion in deciding the
case on narrow or broad grounds, and thus can exercise a certain de-
gree of control over how much law it makes.  But it cannot escape
adopting some legal proposition, and in a case presenting a novel legal
question, even the most minimalist of decisions139 might require the
court to commit to a relatively significant proposition.  Such a com-
mitment can have both normative and factual dimensions.  Even if we
assume full appreciation of the factual landscape, the court might fail
to adopt the correct rule (however “correctness” is to be assessed)
from a normative perspective.  Alternatively, even a court with the
appropriate normative orientation might lack a social scientific under-
standing of the world to which it must apply its normative determina-
tions.  A court completely lacking such information will “be forced to
rely on [its] intuitions.”140  In similar fashion, a court forced to make
law on the basis of an incomplete understanding of the relevant fac-
135 Even where apposite social science evidence exists, courts have a mixed track record of
incorporating it into their decisionmaking.  For an overview of the debate over courts’ use of
empirical research in formulating legal rules, see Smith, supra note 133, at 1445–49.
136 See Posner, supra note 61, at 1053 (“For the judge, the duty to decide the case and to do
so, moreover, with reasonable dispatch is primary.”); see also Oldfather, supra note 11, at 124.
137 See VERMEULE, supra note 115, at 154 (“Stalemate is not tolerable for judges who must
actually choose interpretive rules on which decisions will be based today and tomorrow and the
next day rather than a generation on.  From the standpoint of the institutionalist judge, then, the
hard question is what to do in the short run, given the absence of necessary information and the
limited capacity of boundedly rational judges to absorb whatever information is present.”).
138 For an overview of justiciability doctrines and justifications thereof, see generally
Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 86 TEX. L. REV. 73 (2007).
139 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
140 Smith, supra note 133, at 1449.
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tual landscape might be led astray, for the simple reason that partial
information about a problem might provide a decisionmaker with a
very different sense of the appropriate resolution than would com-
plete or near complete information.141
Another aspect of judicial lawmaking that distinguishes it from
that performed by legislatures and administrative agencies is that it
occurs on a case-by-case basis.  This makes it susceptible to what Pro-
fessor Adrian Vermeule has called “the distorting force of particu-
lars.”142  The resolution of a case based on something other than an ad
hoc assessment of the equities on the facts presented involves making
resort to justificatory reasons.  Regardless of whether they are so
identified, such reasons operate as rules—cases in which the triggers
for the reasons are presented will be treated in one way, while cases in
which the rules are not present will be treated differently.143  By their
very nature, rules are, of course, both over- and underinclusive—that
is, a decisionmaker operating according to a rule will resolve some
subset of cases differently than would a perfectly just decisionmaker
resolving cases unconstrained by rules.144  This creates a problem in
situations where the first case—the one in which the rule does not yet
exist and must be formulated by the court—is one which would be
141 As Vermeule points out, even relevant information about a problem can be useless, and
even misleading, until the decisionmaker has gathered other pieces of information as well.
VERMEULE, supra note 115, at 162 (“The benefit of gathering data may just as easily prove to be
nil—not even helpful—until the amount of data reaches some discontinuous threshold, perhaps
a very high threshold.  Just as knowing only the first digit of a phone number is essentially use-
less, so too, if we currently know 5 percent of what we would have to know to choose between
the alternative rules of statutory precedent, then we might increase our knowledge tenfold and
still only know half of what we need to.”).  Such a dynamic will not always exist, of course, and it
will often be the case that action based on partial information is quite sensible. See id. at 162–63.
142 Id. at 38 (“The concern here is that vivid costs in particular cases may trigger cognitive
failings in both theorists and judges, causing them to overreact to the specifics of particular cases
while ignoring the overall systemic effects of the interpretive rules they defend or adopt.” (cita-
tion omitted)).  Karl Llewellyn noted this phenomenon as well. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 51,
at 43–44.
143 As broken down by Professor Schauer, a court offering a reason for a decision takes the
issue at hand to a higher level of generality and makes an implicit commitment to be bound by
that reason in future situations. See Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633,
640 (1995).  Because a reason, being more general than the specific question under considera-
tion, will have implications extending beyond the specific situation under consideration, the pro-
cess of giving reasons can commit the decisionmaker to decide unanticipated future cases in
what may turn out to be a suboptimal fashion. See id. at 649, 651.  Thus, the process of giving
reasons limits a reason-giver’s ability to take full account of the context in which a future deci-
sion will arise, which in turn suggests that reason-giving is appropriate in contexts where abstrac-
tion and generalization are desirable, but not where particularization and contextualization are
important. See id. at 653–54.
144 See Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 956–58 (1995).
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resolved differently under the best formulation of a rule governing the
class of cases of which it is a part than it would were it adjudicated on
its own merits independent of a rule.  Put another way, the problem
arises where the case before the court would fall within the over- or
underinclusive treatment categories, such that the correct resolution
under the appropriate rule would be the “wrong” result under a more
particularized assessment.  In such a circumstance a court will be
tempted to decide the case in a manner that is consistent with a just
result in the particular case and thus will be led to articulate a rule
that is inappropriate for the just resolution of the larger body of future
cases.
There are two dimensions to the problem.  The first concerns the
difficulty of assessing representativeness.  The judge, as Professor
Schauer puts it, is necessarily focused “on the this-ness” of the case
before her.145  While she will be mindful of the need to craft a rule to
be applied to similar cases in the future, the most salient task con-
fronting her will be the need to decide the specific case with which she
is presented.146  Its salience, and the relative obscurity of the fact pat-
terns that might arise in future cases, will tend to bend the court’s
resolution, and thus its rule formulation, toward the optimal approach
to cases like the one before the court.  Put another way, the court
might be led to conclude that the immediate case is representative of
the larger class of cases to which its rule will apply when it in fact is
not.  To a large degree, this is simply a function of human psychol-
ogy.147  The particulars of the immediate case will dominate the
judge’s thinking, leading the judge to “make aggregate decisions that
are overdependent on the particular event and that overestimate the
representativeness of that event within some larger array of events.”148
145 Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 884 (2006).
146 This stands in contrast to the rulemakers who are not constrained by the need to resolve
a particular dispute. See id. at 891.
147 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Bottom-Up Versus Top-Down Lawmaking, 73 U. CHI. L. REV.
933, 942 (2006) (noting the effects of the “availability heuristic” on judicial lawmaking).  Rach-
linski notes a series of other pathologies inherent in case-based rulemaking, including distortions
in the rulemaker’s “sense of scale and proportion,” id. at 945, relative difficulties in statistical
reasoning, see id. at 946, and increases in subjectivity, see id.  Similarly, Adam Hirsch has ex-
plored the implications of “selective search” on the formulation of rules. See Hirsch, supra note
78, at 605–10.  Because of the impossibility of considering all potential analyses of a problem,
courts and other rulemakers focus only on what appear to be the most promising subset.  The
particulars of the fact pattern before the court will affect the identity of that subset, thereby
potentially affecting the content of the chosen rule. See id. at 605–06.
148 Schauer, supra note 145, at 895.  Schauer writes:
[B]ecause judges (and other rulemakers) in their lawmaking and rulemaking capac-
ity are necessarily engaged in a process of mapping a large array of future events
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Indeed, various cognitive shortcomings may negatively affect the qual-
ity of rules produced through case-by-case adjudication even where
the judge recognizes that the case before her is nonrepresentative for
the simple reason that the particulars of the immediate case will exert
a disproportionate sway over the judge’s thought processes.149
The second dimension of the problem stems from the need to
decide the particular case presented.  The judge’s instinct will be to
decide the case correctly on its own terms.  A decisionmaker merely
presented with an example of the sort of situation as to which he must
make a rule might be able to transcend, at least to some degree, the
sway of the particulars.150  One who must actually decide the case, in
contrast, is less likely to sacrifice justice in the individual case in order
to fashion a decisional rule that will result in more just results across
the run of cases.151
Of course, to some degree our system anticipates these problems
and provides several mechanisms by which lawmaking that turns out
to have been inappropriate can be corrected.152  Decisions from an
that will be governed by the rules they make, the risk is that judges who have a
particular case before them to decide will systematically overestimate the extent to
which those future events will resemble the one they are now most immediately
confronting.
Id. at 896.
149 The facts of the immediate case might be viewed as “framing” or “anchoring” the
judge’s thought processes. See id. at 896–98.
150 Professor Rachlinski echoes these ideas, noting that “the pervasive message of the psy-
chological literature on judgment and choice is that context influences decisionmaking—often
more so than a decision’s underlying logical structure.”  Rachlinski, supra note 147, at 940.  The
case-by-case approach, inherent in judicial lawmaking, leaves the decisionmaker more suscepti-
ble to being swayed by “the quirks and oddities of the individual parties” and other sympathy-
generating factors than is likely to be the case with legislative lawmaking. Id. at 941; see also
VERMEULE, supra note 115, at 38 (discussing “the distorting force of particulars”).
151 Schauer notes that a court in such a situation could reach the wrong result in the partic-
ular case in order to generate the best rule, or choose to “make less law” than it otherwise might.
See Schauer, supra note 145, at 900–01 (“More commonly, however, the power of the particular
is a power with distorting emanations, with courts often announcing the decision rule that will
most directly produce the correct result in the particular case even though that rule will produce
erroneous outcomes in future cases.”).  Schauer provides a series of examples, from both the
Supreme Court and lower courts, in which the power of the particular seems to have distorted
the lawmaking that occurred. See id. at 901–04.  He posits that if the problem afflicts the Su-
preme Court, which has a tremendous ability to screen its cases, then it is likely to be even more
of a problem in the lower courts. See id. at 903.
152 See Rachlinski, supra note 147, at 951–55 (outlining some of the advantages of adjudica-
tion relative to legislation as a means of lawmaking, including that it is structured to enable
courts to learn over time, that the judicial hierarchy allows for the correction of bad results, the
existence of parallel authority, and the fact that courts approach problems from different
frames).
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intermediate appellate court can be reviewed en banc or by the high-
est court in the jurisdiction.  Or the court, while not technically over-
ruling its prior decision, can use subsequent cases to extend, limit, or
otherwise modify its scope.  Thus, if a panel of a circuit court in Case 1
makes what appears to be bad law from the vantage point of Case 2, 3,
or 4, the parties have the opportunity to ask the full court to review
the case en banc, in which case it could make appropriate adjustments
to the legal determination.  Other alternatives also exist, such as the
possibility of Supreme Court review or legislative correction.  All of
those are somewhat improbable, but the mere fact of their empirical
unlikelihood (especially as to en banc review) does not necessarily sig-
nify that the mechanisms are not used in appropriate situations.  All of
these mechanisms represent ways in which the system, in the standard
phrasing, “works itself pure” over time.153
Here, too, however, reality may fall short of the theoretical ideal.
The fact that the system has the capacity for self-correction does not
mean that self-correction will necessarily occur.  In part this is a func-
tion of the doctrine of precedent, which to be meaningful must con-
strain subsequent courts to some extent.154  But it is also due to
selection effects—the sorts of cases necessary to trigger the appropri-
ate corrections might not be brought because they will not appear to
present strong claims under the initial articulation of the rule.155  At
the same time, the cases that are brought might trigger further distor-
tion.156  When a court sets forth a rule in Case 1, the content of that
rule will affect which cases are subsequently litigated.157  If Case 1 was
153 See Schauer, supra note 145, at 906 & n.99.
154 Id. at 909 (arguing that precedent creates “the omnipresent possibility that any mistake
will be systematically more powerful than any later attempts to correct it” both because such an
effect inheres in the doctrine itself and because of the effects of path dependence).  As Adam
Hirsch argues, in operation the constraining effects of precedent may be to a large degree a by-
product of bounded rationality.  Hirsch, supra note 78, at 612 (“In connection with case law, the
abstention heuristic translates into blind adherence to precedent—or, in the vernacular of juris-
prudence, formalism—with the same result that rules become stranded in the past.”).
155 See Schauer, supra note 145, at 909–11 (exploring the nature of “selection effect”
problems and their implications for self-correction).
156 See id. at 906–07 (“Although a dynamic case-based rulemaking system possesses the
capacity for change, it is not clear that those changes take place at the right time or that those
changes are necessarily or even systematically for the better.  Initially, a significant issue is the
extent to which rules may be changed with excess frequency just because the cases that prompt
change are thought, for the very reason we are considering here, to be more representative than
they in fact are.”).
157 See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 17 (1984) (arguing that cases that are not “close” tend to settle, leaving more
difficult cases for adjudication).
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unrepresentative, or otherwise served as a suboptimal vehicle for
making law, then the cases brought after it are perhaps likely to be
unrepresentative, both because of the skewing effects of the rule as
well as the fact that litigation tends to occur at the margins of a rule.158
But the courts are likely to conclude that the cases that are litigated
are representative of the situations in which the rule applies in the
world for the simple reason that those are the only cases the courts
will see.  This, in turn, might lead to further distortion rather than to
correction.159
B. The Possibility of a Rule-Consequentialist Justification
We have seen that none of the justifications for de novo review,
taken individually, supports its universal use.  Each provides a plausi-
ble justification for de novo review of most legal issues in most cases,
but none supports its use for review of every issue in every case.
There will, instead, be cases in which the implementation of de novo
review will have adverse consequences.  In some cases, an appellate
court’s legal rulings will be worse than the trial court’s, thus sub-
verting the error correction function.  In other cases, those rulings will
be worse than those that would be issued by a different, more expert,
panel of the same court hearing the case or by any panel of the court
in a more appropriate case, thus subverting the law declaration func-
tion.  The practice accordingly cannot be justified on act-consequen-
tialist grounds.
Rule-consequentialism presents a more likely source of justifica-
tion.  Under this approach, the question is not whether any given in-
stance of de novo review makes sense viewed individually.  The
analysis instead concerns whether universal de novo review makes
sense in that a regime of universal de novo review will, in the aggre-
gate, produce a greater net benefit than would some alternative re-
gime, such as one in which appellate courts enjoyed wide discretion to
review legal questions under some more deferential standard.160  This
could be so even though we recognize that the exercise of de novo
review will have negative consequences in some cases.
158 See Schauer, supra note 145, at 907 (“A rule that gets it right 99 percent of the time may
well be a very good rule, but a process that focuses only on the remaining 1 percent may be a
process influenced to believe that some of these very good rules are in need of modification.”).
159 See id. at 907–08.
160 See Hooker, supra note 113, para. 4 (“[F]ull rule-consequentialism claims that an act is
morally wrong if and only if it is forbidden by rules justified by their consequences.”).
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There are several reasons to think that universal de novo review
makes sense in rule-consequentialist terms.161  Some arise out of possi-
ble information problems.  A court faced with the prospect of ruling
on a question of law will not often be well positioned to make a broad
assessment of the consequences of doing so.162  The adjudicative pro-
cess provides courts with only a limited amount of information, and
obtaining the full complement of information necessary to assess the
appropriateness of exercising de novo review would be costly and
time-consuming in many cases.  Often these costs would not be justi-
fied by the economics of a given lawsuit.  Moreover, even were full
information available, there would be no reason to think that courts
could adequately assess it.  As we have already seen, de novo review
will often lead to suboptimal results because courts lack the capacity
to adopt and articulate the appropriate rule to govern the case.  To a
large degree, that dynamic is likely a product of courts’ lack of ability
to reliably identify which cases present poor vehicles for lawmaking.
Of course, we face an analogous information deficit in assessing
whether de novo review, applied universally, makes sense on rule-con-
sequentialist grounds.  Our confidence that such jurisprudential mis-
steps will occur, however, does not mean that we will be able to
prospectively identify and categorize the sorts of situations that are
likely to be problematic.  As a consequence, we might conclude that
such errors are necessary costs of an institutional structure that, while
imperfect, cannot realistically be improved.  We do not know, and it is
unlikely that we ever will know, enough to fully assess in the aggre-
gate the net benefit or deficit associated with universal de novo re-
view.  The same holds with respect to any alternative regime.  These
difficulties are exacerbated by the lack of consensus on related juris-
prudential issues such as the nature of legal standards, the appropriate
scope of judicial decisions, the processes courts should use in deciding
cases, and so on.  The effects of de novo review will vary, for example,
depending upon whether courts are inclined to articulate their hold-
ings narrowly (thus making relatively little law) or broadly (thus mak-
ing relatively more law).  In similar fashion, we would be less
concerned about the adverse consequences of lawmaking under a re-
gime of universal de novo review were we inclined to give relatively
161 The set of reasons that follows in this Section parallels that identified in Hooker’s essay.
Id.
162 These limitations will, to a great degree, be the same as those identified in the preceding
Section as reasons for questioning whether the exercise of de novo review is appropriate with
respect to every legal question raised on appeal. See supra Part I.
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weak effect to precedent.  Our collective disagreement on these mat-
ters makes comprehensive assessment of the various possible regimes
practically impossible.
The impossibility of making such an overall assessment does not
preclude comparative consideration of universal review versus its al-
ternatives.  Rather than attempting to determine whether universal de
novo review makes sense in an aggregate, abstract sense, we can in-
stead ask whether there are identifiable ways to modify the practice
that avoid some of its identifiable, associated costs, as well as the im-
position of significant, additional costs.  Perhaps we can, in other
words, conjure up a way to consistently identify cases in which the
appellate determination of legal issues would be detrimental.  If so, we
might be able to formulate a rule for nonuniversal de novo review that
we can confidently regard as preferable to the current regime.
There is reason to believe that such an inquiry will prove fruitful.
The institutional landscape in which appellate review takes place has
changed dramatically.  Appellate courts at both the state and federal
level now face caseloads that are many multiples of those faced by
their counterparts of a half century ago.163  This “crisis of volume” has
resulted in many well-documented changes to the manner in which
appellate judges perform their jobs.164  Oral argument takes place in
fewer cases, court staff play an increasingly large role in the disposi-
tion of cases, and judges in general have less time to devote to each of
the cases for which they are responsible.165  In combination, the effect
is a reduction in effectiveness of the traditional mechanisms that once
operated to discipline decisionmaking.166  At the same time, the sheer
163 See supra text accompanying notes 79–81.
164 Id.
165 See Oldfather, supra note 92, at 764–79 (outlining the various ways in which the appel-
late process has changed in response to increased caseloads).
166 Other aspects of the changing institutional landscape may have differing sorts of impli-
cations.  For example, a half century ago, Professor Wright argued against the preceding half
century’s trend toward appellate courts recharacterizing issues as presenting questions of law.
See Wright, supra note 21, at 751 (“The principal means by which appellate courts have obtained
such complete control of litigation has been the transmutation of specific circumstances into
questions of law.  Subtle rules about presumptions and burden of proof, elaborate concepts of
causation and consideration and the rest, have been devised in such a way that unless the appel-
late judge handling the case is a dullard, some doctrine is always at hand to achieve the ends of
justice, as they appear to the appellate court.”).  Wright criticized this development on the
ground that it would encourage more appeals and undermine public confidence in the legal
system while providing no reason to believe that appellate courts would reach “better” or “more
just” decisions than trial judges. See id. at 779, 782.
Wright was troubled primarily by appellate resolution of issues that fall more toward the
center of the fact-law spectrum, see id. at 778, and not the sorts of purely legal questions with
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amount of law has increased.167  The odds that a given judge will be
unable to claim basic familiarity, let alone expertise, with the applica-
ble legal standards in some subset of his cases have increased.
Whatever the truth of the proposition that appellate judges once had
the time to engage in as much consideration and reflection as was nec-
essary to figure out an issue, judges no longer enjoy that luxury.  In-
deed, many observers agree that the combination of more law and
judges having less time to devote to cases, and consequently less direct
involvement in the disposition of the typical case, has led in general to
lower-quality decisionmaking.168  These same changes have also made
it easier for courts to intentionally fail to confront all the issues that
come before them.  A court inclined to avoid deciding a particular
issue has a number of mechanisms for doing so available to it.  It
might simply recharacterize the issue, or the important facts of the
case, to make resolution more palatable.169  At the same time, it might
issue only an “unpublished,” nonprecedential opinion.170  Or it might
decide to affirm the decision via a single-line “judgment order,” in
which it does not speak to the questions presented at all.171
There is evidence to support the conclusion that appellate courts
do engage in this sort of avoidance.  Anecdotally, numerous judges
have acknowledged having witnessed or been a part of agreements to
which this Article is primarily concerned, see supra notes 30–33 and accompanying text.  As a
result, the analysis set forth in this Article does not squarely apply to them.  Still, it is easy to
imagine defending the proposition, based in part on an extension of Wright’s arguments, that
appellate courts ought to have the ability to decline to engage in de novo review of such issues.
See Wright, supra note 21, at 780–81.  That would be consistent with the more recent trend,
identified by Judge Posner and others, toward appellate courts emphasizing standards of review
so as to afford greater deference to lower courts and agencies. See POSNER, supra note 106, at
176.
167 See POSNER, supra note 106, at 174.
168 See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 77, at 275 (“The overall quality of the work of the
circuit courts has deteriorated markedly.”); Cooper & Berman, supra note 117, at 704–05
(“[G]iven the pressures of burgeoning dockets, the courts could not remain what they once
were . . . .  [T]he particular mechanisms that the courts have adopted threaten the integrity of the
bench.”).
169 See, e.g., Carolyn Dineen King, Challenges to Judicial Independence and the Rule of
Law: A Perspective from the Circuit Courts, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 765, 785 (2007) (discussing the
ways in which a motivated panel “can produce a result that is not true to the rule of law, either
because it is not faithful to the record in the case or because it does not fairly apply the existing
law, without that fact being apparent to anyone other than the litigants”).
170 Such opinions are of course meant for issuance only in “easy” cases that do not present
the sorts of issues that a court would be inclined to dodge. See Cooper & Berman, supra note
117, at 707–09 (describing arguments for and against use of unpublished opinions).
171 See Gulati & McCauliff, supra note 130, at 162.
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“sweep issues under the rug” pursuant to such methods.172  More sys-
tematically, Professors Gulati and McCauliff examined the Third Cir-
cuit’s use of judgment orders over a seven-year period and concluded
that the court’s behavior during that period is consistent with the de-
velopment of a norm pursuant to which some of the court’s most diffi-
cult cases, presenting issues of indisputable novelty, were disposed of
via judgment order.173  This suggests that, regardless of whether we
deem it normatively desirable in an abstract sense to authorize appel-
late courts to avoid making law, it is descriptively accurate to say that
such avoidance occurs.
The fact that appellate courts already engage in avoidance pro-
vides another reason for considering modifications to the rule of uni-
versal de novo review.  Adherence to a rule of universal de novo
review encourages a lack of candor, and at least occasionally results in
some spectacular failures of candor.174  The judiciary operates under a
strong presumption, if not an obligation, that it will decide the cases
that come before it.175  Because a court cannot openly flout this pre-
sumption, any instance of avoidance will involve deception.  Such de-
ception is inherently problematic, and the reduction in effectiveness of
constraints on judges only increases the concern.  To the extent that
courts enjoy the freedom to “get away with it,” so to speak, the rule
encourages courts to act in ways that diminish their accountability and
legitimacy, and, in general, are counter to the reasons we require
courts to justify their decisions.176
These changes in the context in which appellate courts operate
have led prior commentators to recommend reforms designed to alle-
viate some of the problems referenced here.  Most of these proposals
have focused on lessening appellate workloads by providing expedi-
tious ways for courts to dispose of “easy” cases presenting neither
novel nor difficult questions.177  The now-prevalent use of non-
172 See Arnold, supra note 47, at 223 (suggesting that courts face the temptation to use
unpublished opinions to sweep difficulties under the rug); POSNER, supra note 106, at 165
(same); Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings,
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1374 (1995) (same).
173 See Gulati & McCauliff, supra note 130, at 162, 184.
174 For an overview of the literature relating to judicial candor, see Oldfather, supra note
11, at 155–60 nn.144–79.
175 See generally Oldfather, supra note 11 (exploring in detail this presumption).
176 See Gulati & McCauliff, supra note 130, at 192–96 (arguing that the widespread use of
judgment orders has numerous “secondary effects,” including increases in strategic behavior and
decreases in accountability and legitimacy, that potentially outweigh any benefits arising out of
efficiency or related considerations).
177 See Oldfather, supra note 92, at 746 (noting that most reform proposals aimed at ad-
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precedential, “unpublished” opinions provides the most prominent
example.178  But there are others.  Most closely analogous to what I
consider here, some have suggested that intermediate appellate
courts, or at least the federal circuit courts, be given discretionary con-
trol over their dockets.179  Here again, however, the animating princi-
ple is that there are too many “easy” cases, and that requiring courts
to expend time and effort processing them distracts courts from deal-
ing with the more difficult cases that deserve their attention.
Yet some have suggested that appellate courts ought to have the
ability to pass on some portion of the more difficult cases that come
before them.  Professors Cooper and Berman, having outlined “the
institutional realities that confront the courts of appeals,”180 which
parallel those discussed above, argued that when an appellate court
“is forced to confront a consequential legal issue in a less-than-ideal
context, the case for consciously avoiding the issuance of a firm and
conclusive legal decision becomes especially compelling.”181  Their
prescription is that courts operate in a manner consistent with Alexan-
der Bickel’s “passive virtues” by using the various devices already
available to them to avoid engaging in premature lawmaking, such as
waiver doctrines, nonprecedential opinions, and the resolution of mul-
tiple-issue appeals on grounds involving settled law.182  Professor
Schauer has also argued that courts ought to have and exercise flexi-
bility in approaching cases presenting novel legal issues, suggesting
that justiciability doctrines ought to be relaxed, advisory opinions
ought to be less disfavored, and that courts with discretionary review
should delay deciding such issues until they have had an appropriate
opportunity to assess the factual landscape over which their decisions
will apply.183  He likewise encourages courts without discretionary ju-
risdiction to employ such delaying mechanisms as are available to
them, including deciding cases without issuing opinions and basing
their decisions on narrow grounds until they have acquired sufficient
experience to formulate a rule.184
dressing problems created by the crisis of volume are designed to do so by restoring lost time to
judges).
178 See sources cited supra note 7.
179 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
180 Cooper & Berman, supra note 117, at 730–32.
181 Id. at 723.
182 See id. at 730, 733–35, 738–41.
183 See Schauer, supra note 145, at 914–15.
184 See id. at 915–16.
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These critiques are powerful.  Although they are not pitched so as
to do so, their premises call into question a consequentialist justifica-
tion for universal de novo review.  The critiques fall short, however, in
failing to confront the root of the problem, which is that the practice
of universal de novo review has created the expectation, and conse-
quently a sense of obligation, that appellate courts must always re-
solve legal questions in a plenary fashion.  While resort to the passive
virtues would alleviate some of the problems that we have identified,
it would do so in a largely ad hoc way.  These devices of avoidance will
not be available in every case in which a court might wish to use them.
Perhaps more troubling is the clandestine way in which these tech-
niques would operate.  Courts relying on the passive virtues to avoid
infelicitous lawmaking will leave outside observers with no basis for
assessing whether they are doing so only in those cases in which we
want them to do so, rather than in some other set of cases that the
courts find it inconvenient to decide.  As a result, judicial resort to the
passive virtues will often seem deceptive to the outside observer.
To this point, we have seen that a rule-consequentialist justifica-
tion for universal de novo review is subject to, at the very least, skepti-
cism.  Although they are not couched in such terminology, the
arguments for appellate exercise of the passive virtues rest on prem-
ises that suggest not only that appellate lawmaking will often be inad-
visable, but also that we might be able to identify the situations in
which that dynamic is likely to hold.  If we are able to make such an
identification, we might, in turn, alter the rule of universal de novo
review.  The next Part takes up that task.
III. The Possibility of Deference
Our search for a class of cases that we might exclude from the
reach of de novo review begins with the identification of those in
which the functions of appellate review are least satisfied.  If we can
identify those cases in which appellate review of legal questions serves
neither the error correction nor law declaration functions, or does so
only to a small degree, we will have identified a class of cases in which
the benefits of de novo review are minimal.  From there, we can
broaden the inquiry to consider whether dispensing with de novo re-
view would be workable in practice.
The analysis in the preceding Part supports such an exercise.  If
we accept the proposition that there are “hard” questions of law as to
which no clearly correct answer exists, then it seems to follow that an
appellate court’s failure to provide answers to such questions will not
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equate to a failure to fulfill the error correction function.  This is sim-
ply because, as long as the trial court’s resolution of the question falls
within some appropriately defined zone of reasonableness, it cannot
be characterized as erroneous.185  Some portion of those cases will also
satisfy our second criterion—namely, that appellate review would not
advance the law declaration function.  This would be so not because a
court could not make law, but rather because the cases in question will
present bad vehicles for lawmaking.  Whether due to factual atypical-
ity or a shortcoming in the court’s expertise, the exercise of de novo
review in such cases is likely to generate bad law.186  In this sense, we
might regard law declaration as error creation.187
This Part undertakes an exploration of what a regime incorporat-
ing appellate deference to certain types of trial court legal rulings
might look like.  Assuming we can reliably identify those cases in
which de novo review runs counter to the consequentialist calculus,
we might in its place institute some form of more deferential review.
Counterintuitive and unnatural as this may seem, it is not unprece-
dented.  The most familiar situation in which courts defer to another
decisionmaker on legal questions is the Chevron doctrine in adminis-
trative law, pursuant to which courts defer to agency interpretations of
their governing statutes.188  Another example is the historic and per-
haps still somewhat viable deference appellate courts give to district
court decisions relating to state law issues in diversity cases.189  A
third, less obvious example occurs in the context of appellate review
of jury instructions.190  Despite the legal nature of what is at stake,
trial judges enjoy a range of discretion in formulating jury instructions.
“Usually, an attack on the judge’s various choices in charging the jury
185 See Gulati & McCauliff, supra note 130, at 175 (suggesting that an appellate court’s
failure to decide an issue in a hard case does not deny litigants their right to error correction).
186 See id. at 176 n.89 (“A limited amount of time and a complex issue from an unfamiliar
area can provide a recipe for disaster.” (citing Frank H. Easterbrook, What’s So Special About
Judges, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 773, 780 (1990))).
187 We might also think of these situations as resulting in error creation in a more localized
sense.  Trial courts are generally understood to have a greater familiarity with the facts and
equities of a case.  At least insofar as one is focused on the error correction function of appeals,
it seems appropriate to conclude that district courts will often possess an expertise advantage
that, while it is not likely to extend so far as to position a district court to be better able to
articulate a general rule of law, might well suffice to enable the district court to be better posi-
tioned to reach a result that is more consistent with the governing legal principles, or more “just”
on its facts, than an appellate court.
188 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
189 See Jonathan Remy Nash, Resuscitating Deference to Lower Federal Court Judges’ Inter-
pretations of State Law, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 975, 976 (2004); Coenen, supra note 52, at 899.
190 Thanks to my colleague Michael McChrystal for drawing my attention to this parallel.
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will not work without clear misstatement of the law, real confusion, or
a departure from established form or substance . . . .”191  In sum, ap-
pellate “review of jury instructions is not a search for utopia or an
exercise in technicalities” as would be the case were they subject to
full de novo review.192
In the first two of these instances the rationale for deference de-
pends in part on the conclusion that the prior decisionmaker possesses
a relevant type of expertise that provides it with an advantage relative
to the appellate court.  In the Chevron context, the agency is thought
to have an expertise advantage stemming from its greater familiarity
with the statute and with the subject matter of its institutional charge
and mission.193  In the state law context, district court judges located in
the state whose law is at issue are understood to have an advantage
arising from their greater familiarity not only with the substantive law
of the state, but with the processes and “moods” that will affect the
evolution of that law going forward.194  Because the business of a fed-
eral court in a diversity case is to apply the law of the state in the
manner in which it believes the courts of that state would do so, this
familiarity suggests that district courts will, on the whole, do a better
job of making that prediction than their appellate counterparts, who
are likely to lack that sort of knowledge.  Deference in the context of
reviewing jury instructions presents a different dynamic.195  The grant
191 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 22, § 4.23.
192 Id.
193 See supra note 12.
194 The justification for this “rule of deference” was that district court judges sitting in the
state the law of which was at issue would have greater expertise in its determination. See
Coenen, supra note 52, at 904–05.  Professor Coenen questioned the legitimacy of this practice,
basing his arguments in large part on the justifications for universal de novo review, including
notions of appellate court specialization and collaboration. See id. at 920–31.  The Supreme
Court followed Coenen’s recommendations and renounced deference in 1991 in Salve Regina
College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231–32 (1991).  However, Professor Nash suggests that the
Court has engaged in this sort of deference since Salve Regina and further contends that such
deference is appropriate. See Nash, supra note 189, at 991–95.  He also explores the parallels
between deference on questions of state law and Chevron deference. See id. at 1021.  Elsewhere,
David Frisch has argued that cases in which appellate courts are bound to apply the law of a
foreign jurisdiction due to a contractual choice-of-law clause ought to engage in similar defer-
ence to a trial court’s reasonable interpretations of that law. See David Frisch, Contractual
Choice of Law and the Prudential Foundations of Appellate Review, 56 VAND. L. REV. 57, 95,
111–12 (2003).
195 For a thoughtful article addressing the complex relationship between deference and the
impulse toward acontextual legal standards, see generally Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Defer-
ence, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1061 (2008).  As Horwitz observes, “[i]n deferring to other ac-
tors, courts open up a space for shared legal and constitutional interpretation by other actors
who may be closer to the facts on the ground.” Id. at 1066.
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of discretion to trial judges there cannot be grounded in presumed
expertise, but must instead stem from a more pragmatic assessment
that the exercise of tighter control would generate costs (largely in the
form of retrials) in excess of its benefits in terms of accuracy and con-
sistency.  Thus, it stands as a small exception to universal de novo re-
view justified by the same sort of analysis undertaken on a larger scale
in this Article.
To be workable, of course, any regime of deference requires a
mechanism for identifying the cases in which deference is appropriate.
We might think that, if one of the primary triggers for deference is
nonrepresentativeness, no such mechanism will be available.  One of
the key points in the critique of de novo review is that it will occasion-
ally lead courts to make bad law because they are not good at assess-
ing representativeness.196  If we cannot rely on courts to assess
representativeness for purposes of lawmaking, then one can reasona-
bly question how we can rely on courts to do so for purposes of decid-
ing to defer.  This is a significant point, and it may not be entirely
answerable.  Still, there are several partial responses.  First, making
representativeness doctrinally relevant is likely in itself to make
judges more sensitive to the possibility of nonrepresentativeness and
its negative consequences for lawmaking effectiveness.197  Second,
making representativeness doctrinally relevant would provide the par-
ties with an incentive to present the court with arguments bearing on
the point.  If, in other words, one of the legally sanctioned options
available to the court is to decline to decide based on nonrepresenta-
tiveness, then one of the parties will have an incentive to argue that
the case is representative and the other will not, and as a result, the
court’s judgment on the question will be considerably more informed
than is the case under the current regime.  Third, and relatedly, mak-
ing representativeness relevant would create a role for and provide
likely incentives for amici to participate meaningfully in the process.
Providing incentives for the parties to argue about representa-
tiveness could have broader jurisprudential effects as well.  One of the
primary critiques of the adversarial process as embraced by the classic
model of adjudication is that it often leaves the court without input
196 See supra Part II.A.3.
197 As I have argued elsewhere, judicial opinions can be viewed as a species of informa-
tional regulation.  The literature in that area suggests that simply making a point doctrinally
relevant will raise its salience, which will in turn lead courts to take it into account in their
decisionmaking. Cf. Oldfather, supra note 92, at 792–93 (arguing that opinion formats, such as
one with a paragraph for the claim to jurisdiction, make judges less likely to make mistakes).
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from and information regarding the potential effects of a decision on
those who are likely to be affected but who are not parties.198  Al-
though briefing and other input relating to representativeness would
not completely address this critique, it would likely result in improve-
ments.  These arguments become even stronger if we assume, in a
manner that appears to be consistent with reality, that appellate courts
actually do manage to dodge or otherwise fail to decide legal ques-
tions in hard cases on a somewhat regular basis.199  One advantage of
a mechanism that allows appellate courts to defer openly to district
judges on questions of law is that it would provide courts with a
greater ability to credit the parties’ participation in the appeal,200
which is itself one of the fundamental values and components of legiti-
mate adjudication in the American judicial system.201  At the same
time, open deference tied to and justified in terms of accepted guide-
lines for its exercise would result in greater judicial candor and
thereby avoid some of the pitfalls associated with exercise of the pas-
sive virtues or other, more clandestine mechanisms of avoidance.202
Another systemic benefit of deference is that it would allow for
issues to “percolate,” such that the court ultimately resolving a ques-
tion would have the benefit of a certain amount of experience regard-
ing the possible rules it might adopt before it does so.  The term is of
course generally used in the context of the Supreme Court, which
often waits until a number of circuit courts have weighed in on an
issue before granting certiorari.203  The value of percolation is subject
to question in general,204 and is perhaps even more questionable when
198 See Fiss, supra note 124, at 25.
199 See supra notes 172–73 and accompanying text.
200 I have argued elsewhere that, even though the notion of error correction is an appropri-
ate characterization of one of the institutional functions of intermediate appellate courts, within
the context of individual cases such courts ought to regard themselves as engaged in “derivative
dispute resolution.”  Oldfather, supra note 39, at 6.  Although the dispute will almost invariably
be about whether the trial court erred, approaching the task with an understanding that one’s
task is to resolve a dispute will, I contend, result in a decision that is more responsive to the
parties’ contentions and thus more consistent with the overall aims of our adjudicative system,
than that likely to be reached by a court that understands its task as mere error correction. See
generally id.
201 See Oldfather, supra note 11, at 152–53.
202 See supra notes 169–70 and accompanying text.
203 See Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of In-
ferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 54–61 (1994) (discussing the benefits of
percolation).
204 See id. at 56 (“In a mature legal system, there quite frequently exists a relatively small
number of readily identifiable, plausible interpretations of precedent and sensible doctrinal con-
structs.  In such cases, the independent judgment of inferior courts will not likely bring to the
2009] Universal De Novo Review 361
the court allowing the percolating is a state or regional appellate court
rather than the Supreme Court.  Still, in the context of a case that
presents a novel issue in what might not be a representative situation,
there may be value in allowing the issue to arise multiple times in the
trial courts so as to get a better feel for the landscape over which any
rule of law will be applied.  Thus, deference would allow for at least a
partial answer not only to the empirical questions regarding how a
proposed rule would work in application, but also to the equally em-
pirical and perhaps more readily answerable question of whether the
manner in which the issue is presented in a given case is typical of how
the issue will arise more generally.
There are, of course, reasons to be concerned about possible neg-
ative effects arising out of the implementation of a mechanism al-
lowing for deference.  Perhaps the largest concern that presents itself
is the fear that, given the opportunity to avoid making certain legal
determinations, the courts will exercise the ability to an inappropriate
degree.205  We might legitimately worry that creating an explicit excep-
tion to the general judicial “duty to decide,” even if highly condi-
tioned, will erode courts’ willingness to confront difficult issues.  It is
not so much that we are blind to the fact that even a blanket prohibi-
tion on avoidance can be abused, but rather that we fear that authoriz-
ing even a small amount of avoidance will be taken as a license to
engage in a greater amount.206  Moreover, any regime that provides
judges with discretion will be a regime in which that discretion is dif-
ferently exercised.  Thus, we might expect that different courts will
develop different norms concerning the ability to decline review.  At
least in the federal system, this could result in some circuits—those
least inclined to defer—having a disproportionate influence on the de-
velopment of the law.207  A similar effect might occur within circuits,
as some judges might be more inclined to defer than their col-
Supreme Court’s attention arguments and approaches that would not otherwise present them-
selves either upon the Justices’ (or their clerks’) reflection, through briefing by litigants or amici
curiae, or through scholarly commentary.”).
205 Cf. Harlon Leigh Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 YALE
L.J. 62, 72–73 (1985) (addressing this concern in the context of a discretionary review system).
206 See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 172–73 (1982)
(describing the desirability of blanket prohibitions with respect to behavior that we might some-
times be willing to tolerate, but that it appears dangerous to appear to sanction to any extent).
207 See Gulati & McCauliff, supra note 130, at 191–92 (considering such an effect in the
context of the use of judgment orders to resolve hard cases).  Of course, such disparities already
exist because of, among other things, the circuits’ different norms with respect to the publication
of opinions. See id.
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leagues.208  Perhaps most troubling are likely disparities across subject
areas.  Judges are apt to be more comfortable with or more interested
in resolving certain types of disputes, while those involving difficult,
unfamiliar, or boring areas of the law are likely to get less attention by
most courts and judges.209  As a consequence, the preceding tenden-
cies toward disparate influence by specific courts and judges might be
amplified.210
Another potential objection to deference is that it would ad-
versely affect the perceived legitimacy of the judicial system.  Imagine,
to invoke the scenario most likely to trigger legitimacy-based objec-
tions, that the court in Case 1 elects to defer to the trial court on the
grounds that the panel lacks the appropriate level of subject-matter
expertise to formulate a rule of law.  What happens when Case 2
presents the same issue?  If there is any overlap between the panels in
Case 1 and Case 2, then one of the parties in Case 2 will argue that
there is something untoward about a situation where Judge X claims
competence to decide the issue in Case 2 when she was part of a panel
that disavowed that competence in Case 1.  A similar objection might
arise in cases where deference is based on nonrepresentativeness.  A
subsequent litigant could similarly assert that a court unable to assess
representativeness in the first case ought not do so in the second.
Both situations present the possibility that the issue will be resolved
differently by the appeals court in Case 2 than by the trial court in
Case 1.
There are, however, several responses to these arguments.  With
respect to the decisions relating to competence or representativeness,
the judges in the second case will have more information available to
them than the judges in the first.  Perhaps it will consist only of infor-
mation relating to the second case.  But the interim might also have
witnessed cases in other courts, the resolution of which will provide a
sort of expertise (in the form of other courts’ analyses) and additional
data points on which to assess representativeness.
208 See id. at 188–89.  Gulati and McCauliff speculate that such an effect might not be alto-
gether bad, as those judges who are less inclined to defer might also be those who are more
likely to generate good law. See id. at 189.
209 See id. at 189–91.
210 Any such disparity needs to be considered relative to the baseline created by present
practices.  At present, Gulati and McCauliff suggest, there are disparities in the frequency with
which certain subject matters come before the courts that are a product of litigant behavior. See
id.  Because society’s “haves” will have greater resources and better lawyers, the issues that
come before the courts will disproportionately fall within subject areas of law affecting that
segment of the population. See id.
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More generally, one can question whether this sort of perceived
inconsistency is inherently troubling or instead something that seems
worthy of concern because it is unfamiliar.  Brief reflection reveals
that we live with all sorts of situations in which courts engage in simi-
lar behavior that may only strike us as less scandalous because it is
more familiar.  For one, dissenting opinions are quite common.  That
is, we are perfectly content to tolerate open disagreement regarding
the appropriate content of a rule of law.  Likewise, there are occasion-
ally cases in which the appellate court is evenly split on the appropri-
ate outcome, with the result being that the lower court’s decision is
left standing.211  More generally, we are willing to tolerate the consis-
tent existence of intercircuit and interstate nonuniformity in legal
standards.  These constitute examples of what we might call institu-
tional uncertainty—although the individual judges all appear to hold
strong views about the “correct” answer to the question presented, the
court as an institution is conflicted as to what the right answer is.
Against this backdrop, it is hard to understand why we would be
more troubled by individual uncertainty—a situation in which, either
as a court or as the individual judges making up the court, judges pro-
fess to uncertainty regarding the appropriate resolution of an issue.
Part of the answer may stem from a reluctance to sanction any excep-
tions to the understanding that courts operate under a general “duty
to decide,”212 pursuant to which any form of avoidance is contrary to
one of the fundamental components of the judicial role.  Another may
arise from our having a relatively stronger preference for having an
answer to any given legal question, thus allowing for uniformity and
predictability, relative to having the right answer to the question.213
There is, however, another response to the legitimacy-based ob-
jections.  Given the strong evidence that courts already engage in the
sorts of avoidance that a mechanism of deference would enable, the
question takes on a different cast.  Then, assuming such behavior is
undesirable, we need to ask whether there are mechanisms available
that might present a realistic way to prevent it from occurring.  Thus,
we might explore whether there are any sorts of procedural con-
straints that could prevent such avoidance.214  On the other hand, if we
211 For a dramatic example, see United States v. Mandel, 602 F.2d 653, 653 (4th Cir. 1979)
(en banc), aff’g per curiam 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979) (affirming convictions with one claim of
error denied due to an even division of votes in the en banc court).
212 See supra note 11.
213 See supra note 59.
214 For one such procedural mechanism, see Oldfather, supra note 92, at 794–801 (propos-
ing the incorporation of “framing arguments” into judicial opinions).
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conclude that some amount of avoidance is either desirable215 or inevi-
table, then the question becomes whether we prefer that it take place
in the open or covertly.
If we conclude that carving out exceptions to universal de novo
review makes sense for the reasons outlined in this Article, we still
face the difficult task of determining precisely how to go about doing
it.  Although it would be unwise to attempt here to outline a compre-
hensive standard, for the same reasons we have identified for skepti-
cism regarding judicial lawmaking capabilities, we can nonetheless
identify the basic components of a governing rule.
There are at least three.  First, any mechanism for facilitating the
avoidance of review should be structured to make the decision to de-
fer as transparent as possible.  Such transparency is critical to ensuring
that the discretion to defer is exercised in an appropriate fashion.216
Second, the deference cannot be absolute.  A court’s conclusion that a
given case does not present an appropriate opportunity to articulate a
legal standard does not preclude a determination that a trial court got
the law wrong.  Put another way, concluding that an appellate court
need not commit to a version of what the law is does not mean that we
should relieve the court of all responsibility for determining what the
law is not.  The limited nature of this deference, in turn, raises the
question of the precedential effect of appellate deference.  The con-
clusion that a trial court’s ruling was outside the permissible zone
would of course preclude a subsequent court from adopting that posi-
tion.  A conclusion that the trial court’s ruling was within the permissi-
ble range, in contrast, would be entitled to no precedential effect,
because a subsequent appellate court exercising de novo review would
be entitled to reach a different conclusion.
Finally, we would need to limit the situations in which deference
could be exercised.  At a minimum, the device should be limited to
cases of first impression. If a past court has already done the work of
articulating a legal standard, then we need not be concerned about the
present court making an error in the formulation of a legal standard.
In similar fashion, the existence of precedent mitigates any compe-
tency deficit, because the precedent itself serves as a ready-made
source of expertise.  There is, of course, a line-drawing problem here,
in the sense that there is no foolproof way to identify a case of first
impression.  But the concept at least provides a guidepost for analysis.
215 See supra text accompanying notes 180–84.
216 See Oldfather, supra note 92, at 797–98 (outlining the virtues of transparency as a disci-
pline on judicial behavior).
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Of course, we want courts to resolve most cases of first impression.  So
we need to narrow the field further to include only those cases in
which de novo review will likely produce costs in excess of its benefits.
These are the cases that do not appear to be good vehicles for law-
making.  Those arising out of nonrepresentative factual settings are
the most evident candidates, but we might also include those in which
poor advocacy leaves the court feeling ill-equipped to make law.
Somewhat more controversially, we could allow courts to decline to
decide questions of law where they perceive themselves to be at a
competency disadvantage (e.g., “we don’t know much about tax
law”).217  Or the appellate court might perceive itself to be at a situa-
tional disadvantage, such as believing that the trial court got the right
answer for reasons that the appellate court cannot fully articulate.218
Conclusion
Despite its familiarity and intuitive appeal, universal de novo re-
view proves surprisingly difficult to justify.  As we have seen, its pur-
ported justifications do not extend so far as to cover the whole range
of cases to which the doctrine applies.  What is more, by effectively
forcing courts to make law in cases that are not good vehicles for do-
ing so, it often leads courts to make “bad” law or to avoid making law
by engaging in clandestine forms of avoidance.  When coupled with
changes to the environment in which judging takes place, this suggests
that we ought to take seriously the possibility of allowing appellate
courts to openly defer to trial court legal determinations where the
dangers of bad lawmaking are most prevalent.  Properly constructed,
a regime incorporating a mechanism for deference holds the promise
of enhancing both lawmaking quality and judicial candor.
217 This category is potentially dangerous and would need to be somewhat tightly con-
structed for the simple reason that there are likely to be some areas of law, such as perhaps tax,
in which most or even all the judges on a court lack both expertise and interest.  In those situa-
tions the risk would be that the court would never make any law in such subjects.  There would
accordingly need to be something like a rule of necessity that applied to such situations, pursuant
to which a panel could pass on an issue only where there are other judges on the court who
possess the relevant expertise.  But even that might not be satisfactory, since the whole idea runs
counter to the notion that generalist judges are a desirable feature of our legal system.
218 There are two variables here—not only do we need to be looking for the sorts of cases
where we have reason to believe that appellate courts cannot do as good a job as they normally
would, we also need to be mindful of the possibility that those are not also the sorts of cases
where we might expect district courts to do worse as well.
